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Creativity has many implications for success in daily life, academic achievement, and 
plays an important role in human being progress. Underlying neuro-cognitive mechanisms of 
creative thinking are the subject of intense research efforts in behavioral and cognitive 
neuroscience. Many questions call for an answer: How d es the brain generate creative ideas 
or solutions? Is there only one creative process or are there many? How we can measure 
creativity and what is the reliable test to measure it? Let us begin by asking what we mean by 
creativity and how creativity might be defined. 
 
What is Creativity? 
Creativity is arguably one of the faculties that have given the human species adaptive 
ability beyond any other organism. Many articles have been written about creativity, yet 
there is no consensus on its definition. Webster’s Dictionary (Soukhanov, 1984) defines 
creative as having the ability to create, and create as “to bring in to being”. A second 
definition of create is “to produce through artistic effort”. Another definition of creative is 
marked by originality. A large number of theories have been proposed to defined creativity 
as a psychological process that produces original ad appropriate ideas, including Guilford’s 
(1950) psychometric theory, Wertheimer’s (1959) Gestalt theory, Mednick’s (1962) and 
Eysenck’s (1995) associational theories, Campbell’s (1960) Darwinian theory, Amabiles’s 
(1983) social-psychological theory, Sternberg and Lubart’s (1995) investment theory, and 
Martindale’s (1995) cognitive theory. All of these theories contribute to our understanding of 
creativity. However, modern creativity research is commonly said to begin with Joy Paul 
Guilford in 1950, when he pointed out the very important nature of creativity as a research 
topic, and in 1967, when he distinguished between divergent and convergent types of 
creative problem solving. 
 In our daily life, we are constantly faced with problems and situations that require the 
generation of creative and novel ideas, either by divergent or convergent thinking. Imagine, if 
there was a situation in which one was required to come up with as many solutions as 
possible to address that situation; for instance whn being asked “how do you spend your 
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time productively if you have a week off?”. Or in a situation where there are few or just one 
correct solution to solve the problem, for example, “Your car suddenly dies on its own while 
you are driving. Then you try to find what is the problem and how to solve it”. In such kinds 
of scenarios, one needs to use divergent and convergent thinking modes, respectively, to 
solve the problems. 
According to Guilford (1967), divergent and convergent thinking are two types of human 
response to a set problem.  Guilford defined divergent or “synthetic thinking” as the ability to 
draw on ideas from across disciplines and fields of inquiry to reach a deeper understanding of 
the world and one's place in it. He, thus, associated divergent thinking with creativity, 
appointing it with several characteristics: 
1. fluency (the ability to produce a great number of ideas or pr blem solutions in a short 
period of time); 
2. flexibility (the ability to simultaneously propose a variety of approaches to a specific 
problem); 
3. originality (the ability to produce new, original ideas); 
4. elaboration (the ability to systematize and organize the details of an idea in a head 
and carry it out). 
 
Divergent thinking is a thought process or method used to generate creative ideas by 
exploring many possible solutions (Figure 1a) and typically occurs in a spontaneous, free-
flowing manner, such that many ideas are generated in a random, unorganized fashion. Many 
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Figure 1: Hypothetical charts of divergent and convergent thinking. In the chart of divergent thinking 
(a), fluency, flexibility, originality, and elaboration are represented by number of circles, circles with
same color, black circle with longest arrow, and size of the circles respectively. In the chart of 
convergent thinking (b), the correct solution is represented by a black circle.  
 
Convergent thinking is a term developed by Guilford as opposite to divergent thinking. 
This type of creativity is oriented towards deriving the single best (or correct) answer to a 
clearly defined question. It has a strong emphasis on peed, accuracy, logic, and focuses on 
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accumulating information, recognizing the familiar, eapplying set techniques, and 
preserving the already known. It is based on familiarity with what is already known (i.e., 
knowledge) and is most effective in situations where a ready-made answer exists and needs 
simply to be recalled from stored information, or worked out from what is already known by 
applying conventional and logical search, recognitio  and decision-making strategies. 
Convergent thinking is a style of thought that attempts to consider all available information 
and arrive at the single best possible answer (Figure 1b).  
Divergent and convergent thinking are ideal types, and not mutually exclusive. In this 
thesis, divergent and convergent thinking are considered as two different types of creativity 
and not necessarily as opposites. 
 
Dopamine and Cognitive Processes 
The function of cortical dopamine has been known to play a role in cognitive 
performance of working memory in human (Kimberg, et al. 1997, 2001; Luciana, et al. 1992, 
1998) as well as in animal research (Brozoski et al., 1979; Goldman-Rakic, 1992; Williams 
& Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Castner t al., 2000), reward based learning (Hollerman & Schultz, 
1998; Schultz et al., 2000), and in cognitive flexibility (Frank, 2005; Cools, 2008; Garcia-
Garcia et al., 2010). 
It has been reported that the age-related loss of dopamine (D2 receptors and DA 
transporters) is associated with decrease in prefrontal metabolism (Volkow, 2000) and with 
performance on tests of executive function (Volkow, 1998; Mozley LH, 2001). A variety of 
neuropsychological studies in clinical populations suggest a direct association between 
altered dopamine transmission in the prefrontal cortex and cognitive deficits (Müller et al, 
1998) that have been described in disorders with a decrease in dopamine functioning, such as 
Parkinson’s disease (Gotham et al., 1988), and ADHD (Volkow, 2009) and also in disorders 
in which an increase in dopamine functioning has been hypothesized, such as schizophrenia 
(Knable and Weinberger, 1997), Hungtington’s disease (Cha et al. 1998, Iversen and Iversen, 
2007) and depression (Jimerson,1987). This suggests tha  a specific level of dopamine is 
necessary for an optimal functioning of the prefrontal cortex, as described by an inverted U-





























Figure 2: An inverted U-shaped relationship between cortical dopamine and cognitive performance. 
When either cortical dopamine levels activity are blow the optimal range, as may occur in 
Parkinson’s disease, or above the optimal range, as m y occur in schizophrenia, cognitive 
performance is impaired (based on Williams & Goldman-Rakic., 1995; Lidow et al., 1998; Cools et 
at., 2001; Vijayraghavan et al., 2007). 
Dopamine and Creativity 
Until now, little is known about the biological underpinnings of creativity and 
neuroanatomical correlates. Both direct and indirect evidence suggests that the dopamine 
system may play a particular role in creative thinking. Findings suggest a relationship 
between the personality trait of SEEK and creativity (Reuter et al., 2005). The SEEK 
dimension is an interesting trait for creativity research because, on the one hand, it is 
conceptualized as having a strong biological basis nd, on the other hand, it explicitly 
assesses aspects of creativity, like eagerness to solve problem and favoring activities related 
to exploring new things. There is substantial evidence that the personality traits linked to 
creativity are modulated by dopaminergic activity (Panksepp et al., 1998), in particular the 
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activity of dopamine D2 receptors: Novelty seeking is correlated with D2 binding potential 
(D2BP) (Kaasinen, Aalto, Nagren, & Rinne, 2004; Suhara, et al., 2002), and has also been 
associated with polymorphisms of the dopamine D2 receptor gene - DRD2 (Berman, 
Ozkaragoz, Young, & Noble, 2002).  
Further evidence comes from a recent behavioral genetics study where individuals with 
the DRD2 TAQ IA polymorphism (which results in a 30–40% reduction in DA-D2 receptor 
density) showed significantly better performance in creativity tasks (a divergent thinking test: 
the Inventiveness battery of the Berliner Intelligenz-Struktur-Test) (Reuter, Roth, Holve, & 
Hennig, 2006). This finding is consistence with functional imaging research showing the D2 
system to be involved in attentional set shifting ad response flexibility, which are important 
components of divergent thinking (Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008).  
Furthermore, the finding indicates that divergent thinking is related to regional 
differences in D2 densities, since the DRD2-TAQ-IA polymorphism has been shown to 
modulate D2 binding potential (D2BP) in both striatal (Ritchie & Noble, 2003) and 
extrastriatal regions (Hirvonen et al., 2009). Evidence on where to expect regional D2 density 
differences related to divergent thinking comes from the link between creativity and 
psychopathology: in healthy individuals various creativity-related measures, including 
divergent thinking, have been associated with the personality traits psychoticism and 
schizotypy, as well as genetic liability for schizophrenia spectrum and bipolar disorders 
(Batey & Furnham, 2008; Burch et al., 2006; Eysenck, 1995; Folley & Park, 2005; Post, 
1994; Richards et al., 1988). Particularly, the networks relevant to divergent thinking overlap 
to a great extent with regions and networks affected in schizophrenia and bipolar disorders. 
Furthermore, dopamine is known to influence processing in these networks and alterations in 
dopaminergic function and activity of D2 receptors have been linked to both positive and 
negative symptoms (e.g. Guillin et al., 2007; Cousins, Butts & Young, 2009; Weinberger & 
Laruelle, 2001). Manzano and colleagues (2010) have shown that the dopamine system in 
healthy, highly creative people has a lower density of D2 receptors in the thalamus than in 
less creative people, similar in some respects to what is seen in people with schizophrenia. 
Taken together, this is further evidence suggesting a link between brain dopamine function 
and creative performance. 
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Also of relevance for the research reported in thisesis is the modulatory role of 
dopamine in affect and creativity. As reviewed in the next section, it has been also shown 
that positive affect improves performance in several tasks that typically are used as indicators 
of creativity or innovative problem solving (Isen et al., 1987). Ashby et al. (1999) assumed 
that some of the cognitive influences of positive mood are due to increased levels of 
dopamine in frontal cortical areas that result from the events eliciting the elevation in mood. 
The theory developed by Ashby and colleagues (1999) described some of the neural 
pathways and structures that might participate in mediating the neural effect of positive affect 
and its influence on cognition with special emphasis on creative problem solving. So one 
might conclude that dopamine modulates effect of positive mood on creative performance.  
 
Affect and creativity 
The impact of positive and negative affect on cognitive processes has been shown in 
several studies. For example, positive affect enhances cognition of associative (Bar, 2009), 
and semantic priming (Haänze & Hesse, 1993), and negative affect narrows the focus of 
attention, increasing analytical processing, causal re soning, and reliance on systematic 
processing (Pham, 2007). There is general agreement that tasks of creative thinking are mood 
sensitive, and among the many variables that have been shown to predict creativity, mood 
stands out as one of the most widely studied and least doubtful predictors (e.g., George & 
Brief, 1996; Isen & Baron, 1991; Mumford, 2003). For example, Ashby et al. (1999) noted 
that: 
“It is now well recognized that positive affect leads to greater cognitive 
flexibility and facilitates creative problem solving across a broad range of 
settings. These effects have been noted not only with college samples but also 
in organizational settings, in consumer contexts, in negotiation situation….and 
in organizational on coping and stress (p.530).”  
 
Ashby et al. (1999) have postulated that this effect is due to the fact that a positive mood 
state results in increased dopamine levels in the brain, most notably in the prefrontal cortex 
and the anterior cingulate, which leads to greater cognitive flexibility and, consequently, 
enhanced performance on certain cognitive tasks where increased flexibility would be 
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advantageous. These ideas are supported by evidence showing increased prefrontal activity 
during happy mood states (Davidson et al, 1990; Baker, Frith & Dolan, 1997). 
In a similar vein, it has been concluded by Lyubomirsky, King, and Diener (2005) that 
people in a positive mood are more likely to have richer associations within existing 
knowledge structures, and thus are likely to be more flexible and original. Those in a good 
mood will excel either when the task is complex andpast learning can be used in a heuristic 
way to more efficiently solve the task or when creativity and flexibility are required. 
Systematic empirical studies have examined the relationship between affect and creativity 
over the last 30 years. Some of these studies have focused on the direct impact of mood on 
creativity, in particular the effect of positive and negative states or mood on creative 
performance. Results from experimental studies diverge; in general, there are three groups. 
The first group consists of a large number of studies that compared positive and neutral 
moods, (e.g., Isen et al 1987; Ashby et al., 1999; Lyubomirsky et al., 2005), often concluding 
that positive mood facilitates creative problem solving. A second group compared negative 
and neutral mood, but here the findings are contradictory: some studies report that negative 
relative to neutral mood enhances creativity (such as Adaman & Blaney, 1995; Clapham; 
2001), while others show a negative effect of negative mood (such as Vosburg, 1998), or no 
difference between negative or neutral mood (such as Verhaeghen, Joormann, & Khan, 2005). 
Such conflict in the results suggests that relationship between negative mood and creativity is 
very complex. The third group compared positive with negative mood, where positive mood 
sometimes favors (Grawitch, Munz, & Kramer, 2003) and sometimes inhibits creativity (e.g., 
Kaufmann & Vosburg, 1997), and sometimes negative mood promotes creativity more than 
positive mood does (Gasper, 2002). 
 A meta-analysis of mood-creativity relations in the three mentioned groups of studies 
(Baas, M. et al. 2008) revealed that in first group, positive mood relates to more creativity 
than neutral mood; in the second group the effect was small overall and non-significant, which 
means there is no significant effect of negative mood n creativity; and finally in the third 
group positive mood sometimes improved and sometimes i paired creativity. Taken together 
positive affect has a considerable effect on creativity, more than neutral and negative moods; 
however, the type and nature of this interaction is ot well understood, and mediating factors 
like type of task (Davis, 2009) and motivational set (Baas et al., 2008) can play crucial roles.  
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 One idea about how mood and creative processes might interact considers mood as the 
cause and changes in creativity as effect. More recently, however, authors have also 
considered the possibility of a more reciprocal relationship between affective and cognitive 
processes (Bar, 2009; Gray, 2004; Gross, 2002; Salovey, et al, 2002), which would allow 
creative thought to affect mood. Therefore, we can assume that particular mood states might 
facilitate or hinder particular types of thought processes but some types of thought processes 
might also facilitate or even induce particular mood states. 
There seems to be particularly a close relationship between mood and creative thinking, 
but this relationship is unclear. To explain these divergent results, in this thesis we suggest 
that  ‘individuals’ dopamine levels are a factor that might modulate the impact of mood states 
on creativity.  
 
Cognitive control and creativity 
As we have already mentioned, divergent thinking is taken to represent a style of thinking 
that allows many new ideas being generated with more than one correct solution; in contrast, 
convergent thinking is considered a process of generati g one possible solution to a 
particular problem. There is some evidence to support the idea that creativity is not a 
homogeneous concept; instead it reflects an interplay of separate mental sets (convergent and 
divergent), and dissociable processes. In one of our studies (chapter 3), divergent thinking 
has been shown to benefit most from medium levels of dopamine, while convergent thinking 
was best with low levels. This suggests that divergent and convergent thinking are both 
related to dopamine, but to different degrees and in ifferent ways. It has also been shown 
that creativity has an impact on current mood state but convergent and divergent thinking 
play different roles: convergent thinking decreases mood while divergent thinking increases 
it (chapter 5). So if divergent and convergent thinking are related to dopamine and change 
mood in different ways, then we can assume that there are different cognitive mechanisms 
behind them.  
Further support for this dissociation comes from a recent EEG study, where EEG pattern 
differences between these two processes (convergent and divergent thinking) were found in 
θ1 (Theta1) and β2 (Beta2) bands (Razoumnikova, 2000): In the θ1 range convergent 
thinking produced more coherence increases in the right hemisphere, and in divergent 
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thinking coherence patterns in β2 indicated more interhemispheric communication. The 
result pattern possibly reflects topographic and frequency differences between directional 
attention during convergent thinking and ifferential attention while divergent thinking. 
More support comes from another EEG study by Mölle and colleagues (1996), which 
examined differences in the complexity of EEG activity during convergent analytical 
thinking in comparison to divergent creative thinking. The results provide evidence for 
comparable complexity over the frontal cortex during divergent thinking and a state of 
mental relaxation relative to reduced complexity during convergent thinking. Increased EEG 
complexity during mental relaxation was postulated to arise due to unfocused and loosened 
associational thinking. The similarity of EEG complexity during mental relaxation and 
divergent thinking was similarly held to be an expression of loosened attentional control 
during divergent thinking. 
The social cognition literature has shown that mindsets are flexible (Gollwitzer, 1999), 
and can be manipulated on a short-term basis, such as in creativity (Friedman & Foster, 
2005). In convergent thinking conditions individual’s mindset can be characterized as 
focusing on the correct and inhibiting incorrect soluti ns; in contrast, in divergent thinking 
conditions attention tends to defocus and relax rather han inhibiting the ideas that come to 
the mind as possible solutions. Along these lines, in this thesis, creativity was considered as a 
state of mind rather than as a trait—suggesting that everyone can be sometimes more and 
sometimes less creative. Convergent thinking would seem to benefit from a strong degree of 
goal-directedness to find correct solution. In contrast, divergent thinking would not seem to 
benefit from strong top-down control but, if anything, from rather weak and “allowing” top-
down guidance.  
Top-down control or the influence of previously formed representations on the 
processing of incoming information with reference to relevant goals is orchestrated by the 
prefrontal cortex. Top-down influence mediates the activity of neural systems involved in 
several cognitive operations such as working memory, selective attention, goal definition, 
and action planning (Fuster, 1989; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Miller, 2000; Miller & 
Cohen, 2001). These processes can be subsumed under  ‘executive functions’, a term that 
refers to the control processes involved in planning, problem-solving, decision-making, task 
management, and intentional action (Shallice, 1982; Lezak, 1995; Eslinger, 1996). 
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These considerations suggest that the convergent- and divergent-thinking components of 
human creativity imply two different cognitive-control states that facilitate or even generate 
the respective thinking style. Results of 5 experimnts represented in chapter 6 of this thesis 
show cognitive control induced by convergent thinking s beneficial for some cognitive tasks 
which apply strong cognitive control. In contrast divergent thinking induces cognitive control 
state and benefits tasks that apply less top-down control. 
 
Overview of the experimental chapters 
 
In the projects underlying this thesis my colleagues and I have investigated the functional 
and neuromodulatory basis of creativity and tried to identify optimal conditions for divergent 
and convergent thinking. The thesis consists of five empirical chapters (chapters 2-6) that 
report empirical work on divergent and convergent thinking. 
Chapter 2 aims to develop and validate a Dutch version of the Remote Associate Task, 
which is assumed to assess convergent thinking. We used Item Response Theory (IRT) to 
analyze the data. IRT specifies the relationship betwe n the abilities of, and the examinee’s 
response to the specific item.  
Chapter 3 investigated the relationship between dopamine, fluid intelligence, and 
creativity by means of three experiments. In experim nt 1 subjects were asked to perform 
Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM: Raven, 1965) to measure fluid intelligence, 
Guilford’s Alternative Uses Task (to measure divergent thinking), Remote Associate Task (to 
measure convergent thinking), and the individual’s dopamine level was measured by the 
Spontaneous Eye Blink Rate (EBR). Experiments 2 and 3 replicated experiment 1 with 
different groups of subjects. Results show a significant U-shaped relationship between 
flexibility in the divergent thinking task and individual’s EBRs. EBR failed to predict 
convergent thinking and fluid intelligence consistently. We conclude that performance in 
divergent-thinking tasks varies as a function of the individual dopamine level, with medium 
levels producing the best performance. 
Chapter 4 investigates whether the influence of positive affect on creativity is mediated 
by individual levels of dopamine. Two groups of subjects attended to a mood induction 
experiment (either positive or negative mood induction). Their performance in divergent 
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thinking was measured before and after mood induction. The results show that performance 
in divergent-thinking tasks varies as a function of individual dopamine level, with medium 
levels producing the best performance. Positive mood, which often has been assumed to 
improve creativity, affected different individuals in different ways: it improved creativity in 
people with low dopamine levels but no improvement for people with high dopamine levels. 
Chapter 5 studied whether creative thinking might induce particular mood states. This 
assumption was tested by presenting participants with creative-thinking tasks and assessing 
whether this would lead to systematic mood changes. We tested the impact of divergent 
thinking (assessed by the Alternate Uses Task, AUT: Guilford, 1967) and convergent 
thinking (assessed by the Remote Associates Task, RAT: Mednick, 1962) on mood. The 
results show divergent and convergent thinking impact mood in opposite ways: while 
divergent thinking improves one's mood, convergent thinking lowers it. This provides 
considerable support for the assumption that mood and cognition are not only related, but 
that this relation is fully reciprocal.  
In chapter 6, creativity was considered to induce a particular control state that affects the 
way cognitive operations are run. We wanted to know if there is any after-effect of carrying 
out a divergent or convergent thinking task on cognitive control states. Result of five 
experiments show that convergent thinking benefited p rformance in the global-local task 
(experiment 1), the semantic Stroop task (Experiment 2), and the Simon task (Experiment 3) 
more than divergent thinking did. These tasks are suspected to induce conflict between 
perceptual interpretations, semantic representation, and response codes, respectively. In 
contrast, the two creativity tasks had no specific impact on inhibiting response tendency in 
Stop-Signal task (Experiment 4). Divergent thinking benefited performance in Attentional 
Blink task that was assumed to benefit from a relaxation of top-down control (Experiment 5). 
Convergent and divergent thinking apparently induce diff rent control states. 
Chapter 7 provides a summary of the main findings and  discussion of relevant 
theoretical implications. 
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The Remote Associates Test (RAT) developed by Mednick (1967) is known as a valid 
measure of creative convergent thinking.We developed a 30-item version of the RAT in 
Dutch language with high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha =0.85) and applied both 
Classical Test Theory and Item ResponseTheory (IRT) to provide measures of item difficulty 
and discriminability, construct validity, and reliab lity. IRT was further used to construct a 
shorter version of the RAT, which comprises of 22 items but still shows good reliability and 
validity—as revealed by its relation to Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices test, another 


















Most researchers agree that creativity is the ability to generate behavior and behavioral 
outcomes that are unique, useful, and productive (St rnberg, et al, 1996). Therefore, 
creativity is considered as a performance or ability, manifested in original, valuable, and 
socially accepted ideas, products, or works of art. The creativity level of an individual can be 
assessed by means of performance measures derived from creative thinking tasks. Guilford 
(1967), who can be considered the founder of modern creativity research, drew a distinction 
between convergent and divergent thinking. Convergent thinking aims for a single, highly 
constrained solution to a problem, whereas divergent thi king involves the generation of 
multiple answers to an often loosely defined problem.  
Influenced by Guilford’s suggestions to distinguish convergent and divergent thinking, 
many creativity measures have been developed, such as Guilford’s Alternative Uses Test, 
considered to assess divergent thinking, and Mednick’s Remote Associates Test (RAT; 
Mednick, Mednick, & Mednick, 1964), considered to assess convergent thinking. The latter 
was designed in accordance with S. Mednick's (1962) associative theory of creativity. 
According to this theory, the creative thinking process consists inusing associative elements 
to create new combinations which either meet specified requirements or are in some way 
useful.  
The test aimed at measuring creative thought without requiring knowledge specific to any 
particular field. Two college-level versions of the test were developed, each consisting of 30 
items (Mednick, 1968; Mednick & Mednick, 1967). Each item consists of three words that 
can be associated in a number of ways, such as by forming a compound word or a semantic 
association. “Creative thought” is required to find a correct solution because the first and 
most obvious solution is often not correct, so that more remote connections need to be 
retrieved in order to relate the three words to each other. Even though this arguably 
introduced an aspect of divergent thinking, the basic structure of the RAT (finding a highly 
constrained, single solution) fits rather well with Guilford’s (1967) concept of convergent 
thinking. Notwithstanding Guilford’s distinction, in most studies of problem solving and 
creative thinking the RAT has been used as a test of general creativity (e.g., Ansburg, 2000; 
Beeman & Bowden, 2000; Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990; Dallob & 
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Dominowski, 1993; Dorfman, Shames, & Kihlstrom, 1996; Schooler & Melcher, 1995; 
Shames, 1994; Smith & Blankenship, 1991). The RAT has also been employed in a wide 
range of research including studying psychopathologies (e.g., Fodor, 1999), success and 
failure experiences (e.g., Vohs & Heatherton, 2001), affect (e.g., Mikulincer & Sheffi, 2000). 
Performance on the RAT is known to correlate with performance on classic insight 
problems (e.g., Dallob & Dominowski, 1993; Schooler & Melcher, 1995; Öllinger et al. 
2008; Ansbug, 2000; Daialey, 1978), suggesting that at least some items in the RAT reflect 
insight. The materials used in the test involve verbal associative habits that could reasonably 
be assumed to be familiar to almost all individuals brought up in the United States, especially 
in the English speaking part of the US culture. However, it has been noted that the RAT is 
rather difficult for non-native speakers of English (e.g., Estrada, Isen& Young, 1994). 
Several non-English versions have therefore been developed: Hebrew, Japanese, and 
Jamaican (Baba, 1982; Hamilton, 1982; Levin & Nevo, 1978), but to our knowledge there is 
no Dutch version of this test available. Therefore, th  aim of the current study was to develop 
a Dutch version of the RAT: a short, reliable, and valid measurement instrument to measure 
convergent thinking in the Dutch language. To do so we first developed and administered 30 
Dutch RAT-like items. Next, we used Item Response Theory (IRT) to evaluate the 
psychometric properties of this 30-item test, and to shorten the test with the least possible 
loss of psychometric quality and information. To valid te this short version, we related the 
RAT measures to measures from two other tasks that are assumed to assess aspects of 
convergent thinking: the Raven’s Advanced Progressiv  Matrices test (Raven, 1965), which 
is also considered to provide an estimate of fluid intelligence, and an insight-problem test. 
Finally, we contrasted RAT measures with estimates of divergence-thinking performance 




Participants and Procedure 
Participants were students from Leiden University, the Netherlands. All of them were 
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native speakers of Dutch. The sample consisted of 158 participants (133 females and 25 
males). Their age ranged from 18 to 32, with a mean of 20.4 (SD=2.9). They were tested 
individually in 60-min sessions, in which they worked through three paper-and-pencil-type 
tests (the Dutch RAT, an insight problem test, and the Alternative Uses Task, all described 
below), and a computer version test of Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices.  
 
Instrument 
Remote Associate Test (RAT) 
Of the original, English RAT (Mednick, 1962) two college–level versions have been 
constructed, each consisting of 30 items. For each item, three words are presented and the 
participant is required to identify the (fourth) word that connects these three seemingly 
unrelated words (e.g., “bass, complex, sleep”, where the solution is “deep”). The solution 
word for each item can be associated with the words f the triad in various ways, such as 
synonymy, formation of a compound word, or semantic association. The link between the 
words is associative and does not follow common rules of logic, concept formation, or 
problem solving. Hence, with all items of the test the solution word is a remote, uncommon 
associate of each of the stimulus words, requiring the respondent to work outside of these 
common analytical constraints. The score is determined by the number of correct answers 
given in a particular time. 
We constructed a Dutch version of the RAT as follows: First, native Dutch-speaking staff 
members of the psychological department of Leiden University were consulted to construct 
50 sets of words. Each set consisted of three words that were associated with a solution word. 
Next, a group of students from Leiden University (all n tive Dutch speakers) were asked to 
respond to these 50 items, providing a check for strange or saliently uncommon items. Based 
on this screening process, 30 items were chosen. Finally, a separate group of 158 students—
the actual participants of this study—were asked to respond to the 30 item within 10 minutes. 
 
Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices 
Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM: Raven, 1965) test is considered to assess 
insight and has been constructed to provide a language-independent estimate of fluid 
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intelligence and Spearman’s g. We used 36 items on which participants worked for 25 
minutes. Each item of this test consists of a visual pattern with one piece missing, which 
participants are to identify from a set of alternatives. The items get progressively harder and 
are assumed to need increasingly more cognitive capacity.  
 
Insight Problem 
An insight problem is a problem that requires participants to shift their perspective and 
view the problem in a novel way to achieve the soluti n. According to the domain-specific 
theory (see Baer in Runco, 1999), insight problems can be divided into coherent 
subcategories such as verbal, mathematical, and spatial insight problems (Dow & Mayer 
2004). The insight problem test in this study (see Appendix) consisted of three questions that 
included all three subcategories of insight problems: a verbal and a spatial problem (both 
adopted from Metcalfe, 1986), and a mathematical problem (adopted from Sternberg & 
Davidson, 1982). Participants were asked to do the test in 15 minutes. The total number of 
correct responses was used as score. 
 
Alternative Uses Task 
In this task (based on Guilford, 1967), participants were asked to list as many possible 
uses for three common household items (brick, shoe, and newspaper) as they can within 10 
minutes. Scoring comprised of four components:  
Originality: Each response is compared to the total amount of responses from all of the 
participants. Responses that were given by only 5% of the group counted as unusual (1 point) 
and responses given by only 1% of them count as unique (2 points).  
Fluency: The total of all responses. 
Flexibility: The number of different categories used. 
Elaboration: The amount of detail; e.g., "a doorstop" counts 0, whereas "a door stop to 
prevent a door slamming shut in a strong wind" counts 2 (1 point for explanation of door 






Psychometric theory offers two approaches to evaluate the design, analysis, and scoring 
of tests: Classical Test Theory (CTT) and Item Respon e Theory (IRT; see Embretson & 
Reise, 2000). Both theories allow predicting outcomes of psychological tests by identifying 
parameters of item difficulty and the ability of tes  takers, and both provide measures to 
assess  the reliability and validity of psychological tests. 
CTT is widely used as a method of analysis in evaluating tests but it has some limitations. 
First, the observed total score is item dependent. That is, if two participants complete 
different tests that measure the same construct, the meaning of their total scores depend on 
the difficulty of the items in their respective tests. Often observed side-effects are floor and 
ceiling effects. Second, item statistics or the difficulty level and item discrimination are 
examinee dependent. That is, the commonly used CTT-statistic for difficulty level, the P-
value (probability correct), depends on the ability level of the sample of test takers: the P-
value will be higher in samples with high than with low ability levels. Moreover, the CTT-
statistic for the discrimination of an item, the item-rest-correlation, will be highest if 
participants have around 50% chance to answer the item correctly. So, these statistics also 
depend on the specific sample of test takers. 
IRT overcomes these limitations of CTT. In IRT, each item in a test has its own 
characteristic curve which describes the probability of answering the item correctly 
depending on the test taker’s ability (Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 1997). One of the advantages of 
using IRT over CTT is IRTs sample-independent nature of its results. This means that item 
parameters are invariant when computed from different groups of different ability levels. As 
a result, the same measurement scale can be used in different groups of participants, and 
groups as well as individuals can be tested with a different set of items, appropriate to their 
ability levels. Their scores will be directly comparable (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997). Because 
of these advantages, we applied IRT modeling in this study in evaluating item and test 
properties to judge the test’s reliability and validity. IRT asserts that the easier the question, 
the more likely a participant will be able to respond to it correctly, and the more able the 
participant, the more likely he or she will be able to answer the question correctly as 
compared to a student who is less able. In IRT models, it is assumed that there exists a latent 
(unobserved) ability scale, usually called θ, that underlies performance on a set of items. The 
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probability that a person answers an item correctly is modeled as function of this person’s 
latent ability, and a set of item parameters. The probability of a correct answer on an item 
increases with higher latent ability, following an S-shaped curve bounded by 0 and 1: the 
Item Characteristic Curve. There are three common item parameters: the difficulty, 
discrimination, and guessing parameter. The difficulty or location parameter manages the 
curve’s point of inflection (the level of θ yielding a 50% probability of a correct answer), the
discrimination parameter determines its slope, and the gu ssing parameter represents the 
lower asymptote.  
Item characteristic curves provide important and useful information about item 
properties. IRT can also be used to study item and test information functions. Item 
Information Curves (or functions) indicate the range over θ where an item is best at 
discriminating among individuals. More information, determined by the item’s 
discrimination parameter, indicates higher accuracy or reliability for measuring a person’s 
trait level. Item information can be used to select a set of items that together provide much 
information on a desired range of latent the ability scale. The Test Information Curve (or 
function) indicates the amount of information (i.e., reliability) provided by the scale over the 
range of the construct continuum. The test information curve is simply the sum of the item 
information curves of the items in the test. The Standard Error of Measurement is 
reciprocally related to the test information function, and evaluates the accuracy of the test to 
measure people at different levels along the ability continuum.  
 
RESULTS 
Classical Test Theory  
The mean RAT total score was 8.94 (SD =5.21). Internal consistency of the scale was 
determined using Cronbach’s alpha as a function of the mean inter-item correlations among 
the 30 dichotomously scored items. The high alpha value (0.85) of the scale is a sign of very 
good internal consistency with this sample, indicating that the items are consistent in 
measuring the underlying construct. The first two columns in Table 1 show, for each item, 
the total probability correct in the sample (ranging from .02 to .72) and the item-rest 
correlations (ranging from .09 to .65). In general, the 30 items appear rather difficult, and all 
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items are positively related to the overall test score, although this relation is stronger for 
some items than for others. 
 
Item Response Theory 
 Two IRT models were compared in the analyses. A one-parameter logistic (1PL) model 
was specified in which item difficulties were freely estimated but item discriminations were 
constrained to be equal and item lower asymptotes (guessing parameter) were fixed at 0. A 
two-parameter logistic (2PL) model was specified in which item difficulties and 
discriminations were freely estimated but again lower asymptotes were fixed at 0. Because of 
the open-ended nature of the Remote Association Task items, it makes no sense to apply the 
guessing parameter, so the three- parameter model (3PL), which freely estimates difficulties, 
discriminations, and lower asymptotes is not useful here. The two IRT models (1PL and 2PL) 
were fit with Rizopoulos’s (2006) IRT program for R language (R Development Core Team, 
2009) (In this program, it is assumed that θ follows a normal distribution with mean zero and 
standard deviation 1). Model fit statistics are presented in Table 2. 
 
Likelihood ratio tests revealed that the 2PL model provided significantly better fit than the 
1PL model, LRT (29) = 68.21, p<0.001. The AIC-values (lower values imply better trade-off 
between statistical model fit and model complexity) also point to the 2PL model as the best 
fitting one. Item parameter estimates and item fit sta istics for the 2PL model are presented in 
the last four columns of Table 1, with items ordere with respect to increasing difficulty 




Table 1: Classical Test Theory (CTT) Statistics, and Item response Theory (IRT) Item Parameter 













1 bar/jurk/glas 0.72 0.65 -0.58 (0.12) 4.08 (1.13) 4.82 0.78 
2 room/vloot/koek 0.59 0.31 -0.46 (0.24) 0.87 (0.22) 21.1 0.01 
3 kaas/land/huis 0.63 0.51 -0.45 (0.17) 1.53 (0.32) 5.75 0.74 
4 vlokken/ketting/pet 0.60 0.48 -0.34 (0.16) 1.59 (0.32) 3.83 0.97 
5 val/melon/lelie 0.58 0.51 -0.25 (0.15) 1.69 (0.35) 10.4 0.31 
6 vis/mijn/geel 0.56 0.48 -0.19 (0.16) 1.44 (0.30) 4.66 0.85 
7 achter/kruk/mat 0.51 0.42 -0.03 (0.17) 1.25 (0.28) 13.63 0.12 
8 worm/kast/legger 0.48 0.46 0.10 (0.15) 1.48 (0.32) 4.31 0.94 
9 water/schoorsteen/lucht 0.46 0.52 0.16 (0.13) 1.93 (0.41) 12.75 0.18 
10 trammel/beleg/mes 0.37 0.46 0.49 (0.14) 1.72 (0.38) 9.86 0.18 
11 hond/druk/band 0.38 0.46 0.50 (0.17) 1.37 (0.32) 12.01 0.15 
12 goot/kool/bak 0.35 0.46 0.58 (0.16) 1.58 (0.36) 7.92 0.52 
13 controle/plaats/gewicht 0.36 0.45 0.58 (0.18) 1.33 (0.31) 9.61 0.36 
14 kolen/land/schacht 0.32 0.51 0.60 (0.13) 2.44 (0.61) 4.55 0.84 
15 schommel/klap/rol 0.37 0.33 0.63 (0.21) 1.07 (0.27) 10.03 0.30 
16 kamer/masker/explosie 0.26 0.35 1.12 (0.28) 1.16 (0.32) 9.37 0.27 
17 nacht/vet/licht 0.17 0.36 1.46 (0.31) 1.41 (0.40) 15.11 0.06 
18 arm/veld/stil 0.20 0.24 2.04 (0.68) 0.74 (0.26) 10.6 0.27 
19 olie/pak/meester 0.22 0.23 2.23 (0.83) 0.62 (0.24) 8.24 0.46 
20 school/ontbijt/spel 0.04 0.29 2.45 (0.61) 1.80 (0.68) 11.9 0.14 
21 kop/boon/pause 0.11 0.22 2.49 (0.79) 0.94 (0.34) 13.64 0.12 
22 licht/dromen/maan 0.15 0.22 2.49 (0.84) 0.79 (0.30) 6.95 0.57 
23 deur/werk/kamer 0.05 0.24 2.81 (0.83) 1.26 (0.49) 5.14 0.65 
24 ga/daar/dag 0.11 0.22 2.98 (1.09) 0.78 (0.32) 13.08 0.13 
25 strijkijzer/schip/trein 0.02 0.20 3.24 (0.99) 1.54 (0.67) 6.7 0.38 
26 man/lijm/ster 0.12 0.21 3.30 (1.39) 0.64 (0.30) 9.92 0.21 
27 bed/zee/school 0.02 0.21 3.42 (1.12) 1.42 (0.64) 17.72 0.05 
28 riet/klontje/hart 0.10 0.18 3.43 (1.43) 0.69 (0.32) 2.84 0.98 
29 palm/familie/huis 0.04 0.16 3.70 (1.44) 0.98 (0.46) 4.01 0.80 


























Figure 1: Item Characteristic curves for all 30 items of Remote Association Task. Functions were 








































Table 2: Fit Statistics for the 1PL and 2PL Logistic Models of 30-item test 
 
Test Model InL No. of parameters AIC BIC 
30- item 
1PL - 069.32 31* 4200.65 4295.59 
       2PL    - 035.22             60   4190.43        4374.19 
 
Note. 1PL = one-parameter logistic model; 2PL = two-parameter logistic model; InL = log-
likelihood; 
 AIC = Akaike information coefficient 
 BIC = Bayesian information coefficient 
*Thirty item difficulty parameters plus a common discrimination parameter.  
 
 
Table 1 shows that the difficulty levels range between -.58 (fairly easy item) and 5.29 
(extremely hard item). Only 7 items have a difficulty level that is below 0 (an item with 
difficulty parameter 0 would be solved correctly with 50% probability by a participant with 
average ability level); while 23 items have a difficulty level higher than 0. In particular, 13 
items are very difficult with a difficulty level above 2.00, meaning that only participants with 
θ> 2.00 have a probability of 50% or higher to answer th se items correctly. Because it is 
rather unlikely that there are many individuals with such high ability levels (based on the 
standard normal distribution, only 2.5% of the participants have a θ-level of at least 1.96), it 
is not necessary that there are so many difficult items in this test. Therefore, 7 of these items, 
having a low discrimination parameter, were selected as candidates for removal. Moreover, 
one item (item 2) showed significant misfit to the 2PL model (p<.01), and was therefore also 
removed from the test. 
Thus, 22 items were selected as the best items in terms of difficulty and discrimination 
levels. Another set of 1PL and 2PL models were carried out to analyze the data of the 22 
selected items. Model fit statistics are presented in Table 3. Likelihood ratio tests revealed 
that also for the 22 selected items the 2PL model provided significantly better fit than did 





Table 3: Fit Statistics for the 1PL and 2PL Logistic Models of 22-item test 
 
Test Model InL No. of parameters AIC BIC 
22-item 
1PL - 626.85 23 * 3299.71 3370.15 
2PL   - 606.37            44 3300.73        3435.49 
 
* Twenty-two item difficulty parameters plus a common discrimination parameter. 
 
Item parameter estimates and fit statistic for the 2PL model are presented in Table 4 and 
Figure 2.Although there is still an overrepresentation of the more difficult items on this 22-
item scale, the imbalance is much less extreme. In addition, the test was shortened by 27% of 
its length without losing much psychometric information, as comes forward from the test 
information curves of the 30-item test (Figure 3a) and the 22-item test (Figure 3b). More 
specifically, in the θ-range that comprises of approximately 95% of the participants (between 
-2 and +2) the test information decreased by only 10% by dropping 8 of the 30 items. Finally, 
the item fit statistics (Table 4) show that there ar  no items that show significant misfit to the 
2PL model anymore. In conclusion, compared to the 30-item test, the 22-item test shows 
only minor loss in information, but a substantial shortening of the test. Cronbach’s alpha of 






































Figure 2: Item Characteristic curves for all 22 items of Remote Association Task. Functions were 
produced with a 2PL(two-parameter logistic) Item Response Theory model. 
 




































Table 4: Item response Theory (IRT) Item Parameter Estimates (With Standard Errors) and Fit 




IRT- Item parameters IRT- Item fit 
Difficulty Discrimination    χ² 
Bootstrapped 
    p-value 
 1 Bar/jurk/glas -0.60 (0.12)    4.15 (1.25) 5.77 0.59 
 2 Kaas/land/huis -0.45 (0.16) 1.61 (0.34) 7.64 0.56 
 3 Vlokken/ketting/pet -0.35 (0.15) 1.59 (0.33) 6.54 0.71 
 4 Val/melon/lelie -0.27 (0.15) 1.69 (0.35) 10.27 0.17 
 5 Vis/mijn/geel -0.20 (0.16) 1.45 (0.31) 2.83 0.99 
 6 Achter/kruk/mat -0.04 (0.17) 1.24 (0.28) 8.77 0.43 
 7 Worm/kast/legger  0.09 (0.15) 1.43 (0.31) 2.32 1.00 
 8 Water/schoorsteen/lucht  0.15 (0.13) 1.88 (0.39) 9.8 0.25 
 9 Trammel/beleg/mes 0.48 (0.15) 1.72 (0.38) 8.27 0.38 
10 Hond/druk/band 0.49 (0.17) 1.34 (0.31) 7.55 0.57 
11 Controle/plaats/gewicht 0.59 (0.18) 1.29 (0.31) 5.98 0.72 
12 Goot/kool/bak 0.59 (0.17) 1.48 (0.34) 8.7 0.45 
13 Kolen/land/schacht 0.61 (0.14) 2.20 (0.53) 9.3 0.31 
14 Schommel/klap/rol 0.62 (0.21) 1.09 (0.27) 12.25 0.22 
15 Kamer/masker/explosie 1.12 (0.28) 1.15 (0.31) 7.05 0.60 
16 Nacht/vet/licht 1.59 (0.34) 1.31 (0.37) 8.48 0.45 
17 Arm/veld/stil 2.02 (0.64) 0.75 (0.26) 5.5 0.74 
18 Olie/pak/meester 2.28 (0.86) 0.61 (0.24) 5.21 0.84 
19 School/ontbijt/spel 2.60 (0.66) 1.64 (0.61) 6.9 0.44 
20 Deur/werk/kamer 2.86 (0.85) 1.23 (0.47) 4.86 0.83 
21 Strijkijzer/schip/trein 3.28 (1.02) 1.51 (0.68) 7.37 0.44 






























Figure 3: Test information function plotted against convergent thinking as a normally distributed 
latent factor for 30-item (a), and 22-item (b) tests.       
Convergent and Discriminant Validity 
 
Convergent validity has been defined as “how well the construct’s measurement 
positively correlates with different measurements of the same construct” (Hair, 2003). 
Discriminant validity is the degree to which scores on a test do not correlate with scores from 
other tests that are not designed to measure the sam construct. 




































In IRT, subjects answering the same number of items correctly typically do not have the 
same ability estimates unless they have answered exactly the same set of items correctly. 
Therefore, in this part of the research, individual scores on the RAT were derived from the 
22-item IRT scale model parameters. We used Expected a Posteriori (EAP; e.g., Embretson, 
& Reise, 2000) scoring to obtain an ability estimate for each participant.  
Convergent validity was evaluated using correlations between the scores derived from RAT 
(22-item), Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices, and the Insight Problems—which were 
all assumed to represent aspects of convergent-thinking performance. To examine 
discriminant validity, correlations between RAT scores and the four scales of the Alternative 
Uses Task (a test to assess divergent thinking) were calculated. 
As Table 5 shows, the correlations between RAT scores and both Raven scores and 
Insight Problem scores are significant. As both the Raven and the Insight problem tasks are 
assumed to assess aspects of convergent thinking—which explains why they also correlate 
with each other, this provides evidence for a substantial convergent validity of the developed 
RAT. Moreover, the results in Table 5 show that the RAT score correlate with none of the 
four AUT scores, which is consistent with Guilford’s (1967) distinction between convergent 
and divergent thinking and demonstrates the discriminative validity of our version of the 
RAT. 
 
Table 5: Coefficients and significance levels (** for p<.01 and * for p<.05) for tests of correlation 
between Remote Association Task (RAT: 22-item), Insight Problems (IP), Raven’s Advanced 
Progressive Matrices (Raven), and Alternative Uses Ta k (AUT, FLU=fluency, FLE=flexibility, 
ORI=originality, ELA=elaboration). 
 
 RAVEN    IP AUT- FLU AUT-FLE AUT-ORI AUT-ELA 
RAT (22-item) 0.47** 0.39** -0.07 0.07 -0.01 -0.13 
RAVEN  0.32** -0.14 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 





The aim of this study was to develop a short, reliable, and valid Dutch version of 
Mednick’s (1967) RAT, which is widely used and considered a reliable measure of creative 
(convergent) thinking. To do so, we collected and aalyzed data from a sample of Dutch 
university students. The CTT analysis revealed that the original 30-item test has high internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha =.85). The IRT analysis allowed us to reduce the 30-item set 
to a more efficient 22-item version that proved to be a high-quality instrument. The items 
were most consistent with a 2PL RIT model and they ad unique discrimination and 
difficulty parameters. As expected, the Dutch 22-item RAT score was related to fluid 
intelligence scores, as measured by the Raven, and insight problem solving, as assessed by 
our 3-domain compound task, but not to divergent thinking. These findings provide strong 
evidence for the convergent and discriminant validity of our task version, respectively, which 
result in good construct validity. Furthermore, these findings encourage the use of the test as 
a good measure of creative convergent thinking.  
Although the present study provides encouraging results, our sample (n=158) was not 
very large and restricted to university students. This is likely to be sufficient for standard 
experimentation, which usually considers student at participants, but may not provide a solid 
basis for investigating a more diverse population including children and elderly participants, 
or participants with a more diverse educational background. Accordingly, we regard the 
present evidence for the validity of the test preliminary. Although the 30-item is reliable and 
has high internal consistency, we recommend the 22-item version for most studies, as it is 
less time-consuming and does not contain very difficult and low-discriminant items. 
However, it is possible that studies in highly gifted individuals benefit from the inclusion of 
the highly difficult items that we excluded in the present study.  
IRT-based models have been studied extensively and widely implemented in educational 
measurement for investigating the properties of tests, items, and examinees. IRT analyses can 
contribute to the improvement of the assessment instruments, ultimately enhancing the 
validity of the instrument. As far as we know, our study is the first to apply IRT to validate 
the RAT. To summarize, the Dutch 22-item version of the RAT developed in the present 
study provides a convenient and rather efficient tes  to measure convergent thinking with an 
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Instructions and solutions to the insight problems 
1. Coin problem: A dealer in antique coins got an offer to buy a be utiful bronze coin. The 
coin had an emperor’s head on one side and the date 544 B.C. stamped on the other side. The 
dealer examined the coin, but instead of buying it, he called the police to arrest the man. 
What made him realize that the coin was fake? (Adopted from Metcalfe, 1986).  
2. Solution: In 544 B.C. there was no knowledge of Jesus Christ as he was as yet unborn. A 
coin from that time thus could not be marked ‘B.C’. Most initial false solutions concern 
whether the date matched the emperor ruling in 544 B.C., whether bronze was already 
discovered, etc. 
3. Egg problem: Using only one 7-minute hourglass and one 11-minute hourglass, how 
will you be able to time the boiling of an egg for exactly 15 minutes? (Adopted from 
Sternberg & Davidson, 1982).  
4. Solution: Start both hourglasses at the same time. When the 7-minute hourglass runs out 
(and 4 minutes remain on the 11-minutes hourglass), start boiling the egg. After the 4 
minutes have elapsed, turn it over the 11-minute hourglass again to obtain a total time of 15 
minutes. An egg is customarily put into a pot of water as soon as it commences to boil. To 
arrive at the correct solution, the fixedness to approach the problem using this strategy must 
be overcome. 
5. Triangle problem (spatial problem): The triangle of dots in the picture provided here 
points to the bottom of the page by moving only three dots? (Adopted from Metcalfe, 1986).  
6. Solution: Dots to be moved are the dots on the bottom left, bottom right and the top. 
The correct solution requires a mental rotation. 
  
           Problem:                                                          Solution:   
 













The (b)link between creativity and dopamine:  
Spontaneous eye blink rates predict and dissociate 
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Human creativity has been claimed to rely on the neurotransmitter dopamine, but 
evidence is still sparse. We studied whether individual performance (N=117) in divergent 
thinking (Alternative Uses Task) and convergent thinking (Remote Association Task) can be 
predicted by the individual spontaneous eye blink rate (EBR), a clinical marker of 
dopaminergic functioning. EBR predicted flexibility in divergent thinking and convergent 
thinking, but in different ways. The relationship with flexibility was independent of 
intelligence and followed an inverted U-shape function with medium EBR being associated 
with greatest flexibility. Convergent thinking was positively correlated with intelligence but 
negatively correlated with EBR, suggesting that higher dopamine levels impair convergent 
thinking. These findings support the claim that creativity and dopamine are related, but they 






Creativity is the human capital one often says, especially in times of economic crises. 
And yet, very little is known about how creativity works (Sternberg, Kaufman & Pretz, 
2002), which severely limits our possibilities to systematically develop that capital. To a 
substantial degree the lack of convergent theorizing on creativity has to do with 
disagreements on how to define it (by the processes underlying creativity vs. the products it 
brings about) and how to measure it (see Brown, 1989; Runco, 2007). Moreover, there is 
increasing evidence that truly creative acts do not reflect the operation of just one process, 
brain area, or faculty but, rather, the interplay of multiple cognitive processes and neural 
networks (e.g., Dietrich, 2004; Eysenck, 1993; Heilman, 2005). This raises the question of 
how this interplay is orchestrated, and there are reasons to believe that the neurotransmitter 
dopamine (DA) plays an important role in that.  
Eysenck (1993) has related aspects of creativity to schizophrenia, and pointed out that 
schizophrenics and healthy creative individuals share  certain lack of constraints and 
inhibition in their thinking. Several authors since Bleuler (1978) have attributed 
schizophrenia to an impairment of the associative process in dealing with information, to a 
kind of “widening of the associative horizon” (Eysenck, 1993). This so-called “positive 
symptom” of schizophrenia is commonly treated with antipsychotic drugs that function as 
antagonists of binding DA (particularly at receptors f the D2 family), which has been taken 
to suggest that schizophrenia may result from hyperactive DA signal transduction (for a 
review, see Davis, Kahn, Ko, & Davidson, 1991). If so, and if one considers the possibility 
that schizophrenics and healthy creative individuals are more associative than the average for 
the same reasons, it makes sense to assume a link between creativity and DA (Eysenck, 
1993). Indeed, Carson, Peterson, and Higgins (2003) have reported differences in latent 
inhibition (an effect that is modulated by DA-targeting drugs) between more and less creative 
individuals. 
A similar conclusion was reached by Ashby, Isen, and Turken (1999) in their attempt to 
explain the beneficial effect of mood on creative behavior. They assume that higher DA 
levels are associated with greater cognitive flexibility and less inhibition between alternative 
thoughts (cf., Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992). Under the additional assumption that 
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positive mood leads to a further, phasic increase of the individual DA level, better mood 
would indeed be expected to yield better performance i  creativity tasks. Further support 
comes from a recent behavioral genetics study, where individuals with the DRD2 TAQ IA 
polymorphism (which results in a 30-40% reduction in DA-D2 receptor density) showed 
significantly better performance in creativity tasks (Reuter, Roth, Holve, & Hennig, 2006). 
This fits with the fact that D2-antagonistic drugs alleviate the positive symptoms of 
schizophrenia. It also fits with computational considerations that relate DA-D2 receptors to 
inhibitory processes (Frank, Seeberger & O'Reilly, 2004) and with empirical observations 
that cocaine use—which is associated with a damage of D2 receptors—is accompanied by 
impaired performance in tasks tapping into stimulus and response inhibition (Colzato & 
Hommel, 2009; Colzato, van den Wildenberg, & Hommel, 2007). 
The present study aimed at exploiting individual differences in performance in creativity 
tasks and in dopaminergic functioning, as indexed by the spontaneous eye blink rate (EBR). 
The spontaneous EBR is a well-established clinical m rker (Shukla, 1985) thought to index 
striatal DA production (Karson, 1983; Taylor et al., 1999). Among other things, this 
assumption is supported by clinical observations in patients with DA-related dysfunctions, 
such as schizophrenics who show both elevated EBRs (Freed, 1980) and elevated striatal DA 
uptake (Hietala et al., 1999: Lindström et al., 1999). Likewise, EBR is reduced in recreational 
cocaine users (Colzato, van den Wildenberg & Hommel, 2008) and Parkinson patients 
(Deuschel & Goddemeier, 1998)—two population suffering from reduced functioning of 
DA-D2 receptors and severe losses of nigrostratial dopaminergic cells, respectively (Dauer & 
Przedborski, 2003; Volkow, Fowler, & Wang, 1999). In addition, pharmacological studies in 
nonhuman primates and humans have shown that dopaminergic agonists and antagonists 
increase and decrease EBRs, respectively (Blin et al., 1990; Kleven & Koek, 1996), and a 
genetic study in humans has demonstrated a strong associ tion between EBR and the 









In Experiment 1, we considered two creativity tasks: the Alternate Uses Task (AUT: 
Guilford, 1967) and the Remote Associates Task (RAT: Mednick, 1962). The AUT has open-
ended questions with multiple answers, and is thus diagnostic of divergent thinking. In 
contrast, the RAT has questions with only one, if unconventional answer, and is thus 
diagnostic of convergent thinking. According to Guilford (1967), divergent and convergent 
thinking are the main ingredients of creativity, but in the light of the above caveats we do not 
claim that these are the only processes involved.  
The major question was whether the individual performance in the two creativity tasks 
would covary with the individual EBR and, in particular, whether a higher EBR (indicating a 
higher level of dopaminergic signal transmission) would be associated with better 
performance. Even though we have seen that a number of approaches assume that creativity 
and DA are related, it is not quite clear exactly how this relationship may look like. In fact, 
most accounts do not clearly define how divergent and convergent thinking are related to 
creativity, or to each other, and whether only one r both types of thinking are related to 
dopamine. However, if we consider Eysenck’s (1993) assumption that both healthy creative 
thinking and positive schizophrenic symptoms reflect a certain lack of inhibition, it seems 
reasonable to assume that this would be more visible in a divergent thinking task, where a 
lack of inhibition between alternative thoughts would be beneficial, than in a convergent 
thinking task. If so, one might expect that the relationship between performance and EBR is 
stronger for the AUT than for the RAT. Moreover, the relationship between DA level and 
performance does not seem to be linear but follow an inverted U-shape (for a review, see 
Goldman-Rakic, Muly & Williams, 2000), which might suggest that creativity and EBR are 
related in a nonlinear fashion. Apart from divergent a d convergent thinking, and EBR, we 
further considered fluid intelligence. Even though it seems clear that creativity is at least in 
part independent of intelligence (Runco, 2007), some links might exist, so that we were 
interested to see whether, and to what degree a possible relationship between creativity and 





Thirty-five students of Leiden University volunteerd in exchange for course credit or 
pay (30 females and 5 males; mean age was 20.6 years). P rticipants were informed that they 
were participating in a study on problem solving. Every participant underwent four tasks or 
measurements: a divergent thinking task (AUT), a convergent thinking task (RAT), a fluid-
intelligence task (Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices), and a measurement of the 
spontaneous EBR. EBR was always measured at the end of the session, while the order of the 
other tasks was balanced by means of a Latin square. 
Alternate Uses Task (divergent thinking) 
In this task (based on Guilford, 1967, and translated into Dutch), participants were asked 
to list as many possible uses for three common household items (brick, shoe, and newspaper) 
as they can within 10 min. Scoring comprised of four components:  
Originality: Each response is compared to the total amount of responses from all of the 
subjects. Responses that were given by only 5% of the group count as unusual (1 point) and 
responses given by only 1% of them count as unique (2 points).  
Fluency: The total of all responses. 
Flexibility: The number of different categories used. 
Elaboration: The amount of detail (e.g., "a doorstop" counts 0, whereas "a door stop to 
prevent a door slamming shut in a strong wind" counts 2 (1 point for explanation of door 
slamming and another for further detail about the wind). 
Remote Association Task (convergent thinking) 
In this task (based on Mednick, 1962, and translated into Dutch (Cronbach’s alpha = .85), 
participants are presented with three unrelated words (such as time, hair, and stretch) and are 
asked to find a common associate (long). Our version comprised of 30 items, which were to 








































Figure 1: Performance in (a) the divergent-thinking task (flexibility score), (b) the convergent-
thinking task, and (c) Raven’s APM task in Experiment 1 as a function of spontaneous eye blink rate 




Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (fluid intellig nce) 
Fluid intelligence was measured by means of 36 items of Raven’s Advanced Progressive 
Matrices (APM: Raven, 1965) that were worked on for25 min. This test has been 
constructed as a language-independent measure of intelligence efficiency and primarily 
measures Spearman’s g. Each item of this test consists of a visual pattern with one piece 
missing, which participants are to identify from a set of alternatives. The items get 
progressively harder and are assumed to need increasingly more cognitive capacity.  
Eye blink rate (dopamine marker) 
A BioSemi ActiveTwo system (BioSemi Inc., Amsterdam) was used to record the EBR. 
We recorded with two horizontal (one left, one right) and two vertical (one upper, one lower 
of right eye) Ag-AgCl electrodes, for 6 min eyes-open segments under resting conditions. 
The vertical electrooculogram (EOG), which recorded the voltage difference between two 
electrodes placed above and below the left eye, was used to detect eye blinks. The horizontal 
EOG, which recorded the voltage difference between el ctrodes placed lateral to the external 
canthi, was used to measure horizontal eye movements. As spontaneous EBR is stable during 
daytime but increases in the evening (around 8:30 pm, see Babarto et al., 2000), we never 
registered after 5 pm. We also asked participants to avoid smoking before the recording. 
Participants were comfortably sitting in front of a blank poster with a cross in the center, 
located about 1m from the participant. The participant was alone in the room and asked to 
look at the cross in a relaxed state. The individual EBR was calculated by dividing the total 
number of eye blinks during the 6-min measurement interval by 6. 
 
Results and Discussion 
From the four tasks or measurements, seven measures were extracted for each 
participant: originality, fluency, flexibility, and elaboration scores from the AUT, the number 
of correct items from the RAT, the number of correct items from Raven’s APM, and the EBR 
(per minute). Relationships between these measures were assessed by means of regressions 
(SPSS curve fitting procedure). We report the results (coefficients) for linear and quadratic 
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fits (see Table 1); other types of relationships were also considered but did not provide better 
fits. 
 
Table 1: Coefficients and significance levels (** for p<.01 and * for p<.05) for tests of linear (L) and 
quadratic (Q) relationships (fits) between tests of divergent thinking (DIV, ORI=originality; 
FLU=fluency, FLE=flexibility, ELA=elaboration), convergent thinking (CON), intelligence (IQ), and 




Table 1 provides an overview of the results. Unsurprisingly, the subscales of the AUT were 
highly intercorrelated, except that the elaboration measure failed to correlate with fluency 
and flexibility. More interesting for our purposes, however, were the remaining three 
significant effects. Most importantly, EBR reliably predicted only one other measure, which 
was the flexibility score of the divergent-thinking measure. This correlation remained 
significant if performance in the Raven’s task was entered into the equation, confirming that 
the relationship between EBR and flexibility is independent of intelligence. Also of 
importance, the resulting fit was quadratic, whereas the linear regression of EBR on 
flexibility was far from significant. As shown in Figure 1, the relationship followed an 
inverted U-shaped pattern, with medium EBRs being associated with the highest flexibility. 
  DIV-FLU DIV-FLE DIV-ELA CON IQ EBR 
DIV-ORI 
L       .42** .58**  .53** -.11 .02 -.01 
Q .42* .58** .55*  .11 .21  .21 
DIV-FLU 
L  .84** .10  -.35* -.21 .03 
Q  .85** .13 .36 .23 .23 
DIV-FLE 
L   .07 -.11 -.09 -.05 
Q   .13  .11  .36   .44* 
DIV-ELA 
L     .08 -.06 -.06 
Q     .13 .19 .11 
CON 
L       .37* -.20 
Q     .37 .27 
IQ 
L      -.20 
Q      .20 
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The second reliable measure refers to a linear increase of performance in the convergent-
thinking task with the intelligence measure. The third significant correlation describes a 
negative relationship between convergent thinking ad the fluency measure of the AUT: 





Before considering the theoretical implications of our findings, it is important to know 
how stable and replicable they are. We assessed this issue by running a second study that 
sought to replicate the crucial correlation between EBR and flexibility. We also kept the 
convergent-thinking task to see whether EBR would still be uncorrelated with convergent 
thinking. Note that even though the association measures failed to pass the significance 
threshold in Experiment 1, they did reach a considerabl  numerical size and the outcome 
pattern (see Figure 1b) looked not too different from that obtained for flexibility (Figure 1a). 
Method 
Thirty-three new students of Leiden University volunteered in exchange for course credit 
or pay (21 females and 12 males; mean age was 20.1 years). The method was as in 
Experiment 1 with the following exceptions: The APM was dropped and the AUT comprised 
of only one common household item (cup) with 5 min to list alternative uses. Only 22 of the 
participants performed the RAT. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The data were treated as in Experiment 1. Table 2 show  the results for linear and quadratic 






Table 2: Coefficients and significance levels (** for p<.01 and * for p<.05) for tests of linear (L) and 
quadratic (Q) relationships (fits) between tests of divergent thinking (DIV, ORI=originality; 
FLU=fluency, FLE=flexibility, ELA=elaboration), convergent thinking (CON), and the spontaneous 














As Table 2 shows, the subscales of AUT were again highly intercorrelated. The linear 
relationship between convergent thinking and fluency obtained in Experiment 1 did not 
replicate, and EBR again failed to predict convergent thinking. Most importantly, however, 
EBR again predicted the flexibility score, and the relationship was again quadratic (see 
Figure 2). That is, the main finding of Experiment 1 was successfully replicated. 
  DIV-FLU DIV-FLE DIV-ELA CON EBR 
DIV-ORI 
L        .39* .66** .27 -.05  .08 
Q .40 .69** .40  .31  .13 
DIV-FLU 
L  .81** .08 .32  .02 
Q  .81** .09 .34  .23 
DIV-FLE 
L   .13 .07 -.01 
Q   .25 .22    .42* 
DIV-ELA 
L    .24 -.12 
Q    .39  .17 
CON 
L     -.39 























Figure 2: Performance in (a) the divergent-thinking task (flexibility score), and (b) the convergent-
thinking task in Experiment 2 as a function of spontaneous eye blink rate (EBR) per minute. 




As we take EBR as a measure of the individual dopamine level, the quadratic relationship 
between EBR and flexibility seems to support the hypothesis that divergent thinking relies on 
dopamine supply. However, given that we measured EBR at the end of the session, one 
might argue that this measure is actually more related to stress, or resistance to stress, than to 
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the divergent-thinking process proper. In Experiment 1, all participants underwent an 
intelligence test, often before one or both of the thinking tasks. Given that people experience 
tests of their intelligence as stressful, performance in the thinking tasks may not provide a 
pure measure of the degrees of individual creativity but, rather, a measure of creativity under 
stress. Stress is known to have a strong impact on prefrontal dopaminergic activity 
(Moghaddam & Jackson, 2004), so that the EBRs might have been modulated by individual 
differences with respect to processing stress or to stress resistance. In other words, the 
individual differences in the thinking tasks might not, or not only reflect individual 
differences in the basic dopamine level of, rather, individual differences in stress processing.  
Given that we were able to replicate the basic findings in Experiment 2, where 
intelligence was not assessed, alleviates this problem to some degree. However, one might 
argue that even the creativity tasks might produce some stress, which might render EBR 
measures equally difficult to interpret. To avoid problems of that sort, we ran another 
replication but measured EBR at the beginning of the session. EBRs could thus no longer be 
affected by task-induced stress, at least beyond whatever stress the mere participation in a 
psychological experiment might produce.  
Method 
Forty-nine new students of Leiden University volunteered in exchange for course credit 
or pay (35 females and 14 males; mean age was 21.3 years). The method was as in 
Experiments 1 and 2 with the following exception: EBR was always measured first, at the 
beginning of the session, while the order of the following other tasks was balanced. AUT 
comprised of only one common household item (pen) with 5 min to list alternative uses.  
 
Results and Discussion 
The data were treated as in Experiments 1 and 2. Table 3 shows the results for linear and 
quadratic fits; again, other types of relationships were also considered but did not provide 




Table 3: Coefficients and significance levels (** for p<.01 and * for p<.05) for tests of linear (L) and 
quadratic (Q) relationships (fits) between tests of divergent thinking (DIV, ORI= originality; 
FLU=fluency, FLE=flexibility, ELA=elaboration), convergent thinking (CON), and the spontaneous 



















As Table 3 shows, the results were almost identical o what we observed in Experiment 2: 
The subscales of AUT were highly intercorrelated an EBR failed to predict convergent 
thinking but showed a quadratic relationship with flexibility (see Figure 3). Hence, 
measuring EBR before or after potentially stressing co nitive tasks does not seem to make 
much of a difference. 
 
  DIV-FLU DIV-FLE DIV-ELA CON EBR 
DIV-ORI 
L      .30* .34*  .29* -.01 .18 
Q .33 .40* .29 .30 .19 
DIV-FLU 
L  .54** .01 .01 .25 
Q  .58** .13 .13 .06 
DIV-FLE 
L   .14 -.13 .05 
Q   .14 .17  .41* 
DIV-ELA 
L    -.31* .12 
Q    .32 .12 
CON 
L     -.19 























Figure 3: Performance in (a) the divergent-thinking task (flexibility score), and (b) the convergent-
thinking task in Experiment 3 as a function of spontaneous eye blink rate (EBR) per minute. 




To increase the power of our analyses we combined th  data from the three experiments 
by normalizing (z-transforming) AUT, RAT, and EBR measures. As obvious from Table 4, 
the increase in power rendered the association between EBR and flexibility highly significant 
and even the association between EBR and convergent thinking is reliable by now. However, 
whereas the relationship between EBR and flexibility is still decidedly quadratic and 
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inverted-U shaped (see Figure 4A), the relationship between EBR and convergent thinking is 
more or less linear (with a trend towards a slightly U-shaped function) and shows a negative 
relationship (see Figure 4B), implying that convergent thinking is increasingly impaired by 
higher dopamine levels. As we tested unequal numbers of male and female participants, we 
reran these analyses separately for men and women. The outcome was the same: reliable 
quadratic (inverted U-shaped) relationships (s < 0.01), but no linear relationship (s > 0.05), 
between EBR and flexibility, and reliable linear relationships (ps < 0.05), but no quadratic 
relationship (ps > 0.05), between EBR and convergent thinking. Hence, our findings do not 
seem to depend on the particularities of our samples. 
 
Table 4: Beta coefficients and significance levels (** forp<.01 and * for p<.05) for tests of linear (L) 
and quadratic (Q) relationships (fits) between normalized (z-transformed) scores from tests of 
divergent thinking (DIV, ORI=originality; FLU=fluency, FLE=flexibility, ELA=elaboration), 


















  DIV-FLU DIV-FLE DIV-ELA CON EBR 
DIV-ORI 
L      .38** .51**    .35** -.06  .09 
Q .37* .52**    .38**   .19  .12 
DIV-FLU 
L  .71** .04 -.04  .01 
Q  .72**  .05   .06  .13 
DIV-FLE 
L    .10 -.08  .01 
Q    .13  .12     .42**  
DIV-ELA 
L    -.17 -.04 
Q     .13 .04 
CON 
L     -.26* 























Figure 4: Normalized (z-transformed) performance in (a) thedivergent-thinking task (flexibility 
score), and (b) the convergent-thinking task in Experiments 1-3 as a function of normalized (z-
transformed) spontaneous eye blink rate (EBR) per minute. Regression lines for linear and quadratic 






The major aim of our study was to investigate whether individual measures of creativity 
would covary with the individual EBR, which may point to a connection between creativity 
and dopamine. The answer is clear but a bit more complex than expected: EBR predicted 
both the quality of divergent thinking, and flexibil ty of switching between multiple 
categories in particular, and the quality of convergent thinking, but not fluid intelligence. 
However, the two associations differed in type, pattern, and reliability: divergent thinking 
benefitted most from medium EBRs, while convergent thinking was best with low EBRs. If 
we take EBR as diagnostic of the individual level of d paminergic functioning, this suggests 
that flexibility and convergent thinking are both related to dopamine, but to different degrees 
and in different ways. Our observations have a number of interesting theoretical implications.  
First, they are consistent with the claim that creativity is not a homogeneous concept but 
reflects the interplay of separate, dissociable processes, such as convergent and divergent 
thinking (e.g., Guilford, 1967). Our findings do not fully fit with the idea that convergent and 
divergent thinking represent opposite poles of the same dimension (Eysenck, 1993), 
however. Even though Experiment 1 produced a negative correlation between convergent 
thinking and fluency in divergent thinking—suggesting that at least some aspects of 
divergent and convergent thinking are mutually incompatible—this association did not 
involve flexibility, the measure related to EBR, and could not be replicated in Experiments 2 
and 3. The same holds for the negative correlation between convergent thinking and 
elaboration in divergent thinking, which we observed in Experiment 3 only. Hence, 
convergent and divergent thinking are not necessarily opposites but they are not the same 
either. In fact, it makes sense to assume that convergent thinking draws on executive 
functions that keep the participant “on target” until the solution is found. Duncan et al. 
(2000) have considered that working memory (a system that is driven by dopamine: Williams 
& Goldman-Rakic, 2002) and other functions related to the frontal lobe are responsible for 
maintaining a high degree of activation of the task goal, which organizes and constrains other 
cognitive processes so to keep people focused on the task. As the findings of Duncan and 
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colleagues show, the ability to keep such a focus is highly related to fluid intelligence. If we 
consider that our intelligence measure correlated positively with convergent thinking and that 
keeping a strictly limited focus is more functional for convergent thinking than it is for 
divergent thinking, a negative relation between convergent thinking and aspects of divergent 
thinking seems to fit into the bigger picture. 
A second conclusion is that different aspects of human creativity relate to dopaminergic 
functioning in different ways. As we have seen, convergent thinking benefited from low 
EBRs whereas flexibility in divergent thinking benefit d most from medium EBRs. The 
observation that EBR could predict creative performance at all provides strong support for 
approaches that relate creativity to dopamine (Ashby et al., 1999; Eysenck, 1993; Reuter et 
al., 2006). At the same time, however, the obtained dissociation calls for a more 
differentiated approach that distinguishes between convergent and divergent processes and 
that allows for different creativity-dopamine functions. For instance, some approaches 
assume that the more dopamine the better (e.g., Ashby et al., 1999), which does not seem to 
fit with either of the two EBR-creativity functions. Other approaches imply that the 
performance-dopamine functions for convergent and divergent thinking should be mirror 
images of each other, with low dopamine levels supporting convergent thinking and high 
levels supporting divergent thinking (e.g., Eysenck, 1993). This fits better with the negative 
slope we observed for convergent thinking but not with the U-shaped function obtained for 
divergent thinking.  
We should emphasize that EBR provides a very basic, ubcortical measure of 
dopaminergic functioning that does not discriminate between the different dopaminergic 
pathways and receptors systems. Presumably, approaches that take these different pathways 
and/or receptor families into account (e.g., Frank et al., 2004) will be able to provide more 
specific, testable predictions with regard to the relationship between dopamine and creativity. 
As the observations of Reuter et al. (2006) suggest, genes related to the DA-D2 receptor 
family play a role in divergent thinking. In the same study, individual variations with respect 
to the COMT gene, which also regulates aspect of dopaminergic functioning, were unrelated 
to performance in the divergent-thinking task. Given that the COMT gene is known to affect 
working-memory performance (e.g., Egan et al., 2001) which again is related to intelligence 
(Duncan et al., 2000), our finding that intelligenc predicts parts of convergent thinking may 
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suggest that convergent thinking is related to the COMT gene. Indeed, working memory is 
mainly driven by mesocortical dopaminergic pathways, whereas receptors of the DA-D2 
family dominate the nigrostriatal dopaminergic pathways, which raises the possibility that the 
former is more closely related to convergent thinking and the latter to divergent thinking. 
A third, more methodological conclusion also refers to the way creativity apparently 
relates to dopamine. The connection between EBR and divergent thinking has an inverted U-
shape, suggesting that a medium dopamine level allows for the greatest flexibility. 
Comparable patterns have been obtained in studies on the relationship between dopamine 
level and other types of performance (e.g., control of episodic retrieval: Colzato, Kool & 
Hommel, 2008; for a broader review, see Goldman-Rakic et al., 2000), which seems to point 
to a general characteristic of the manner in which dopamine regulates and supports at least 
some cognitive processes. An important implication of this characteristic and the resulting 
performance function is that studies investigating phasic changes of the dopamine level may 
be standing on shaky grounds—if, and to the degree that they fail to take individual 
differences in dopaminergic functioning into account. For instance, if it is the case that 
positive mood increases the dopamine level and that this is the mechanism to improve 
performance, as suggested by Ashby et al. (1999), then i  seems close to impossible to predict 
the impact of mood-enhancing manipulations on performance. Participants with a relatively 
low level of dopaminergic functioning (who are located on the ascending, left half of the 
distribution, as shown in Figure 1) would be likely to benefit from better mood, whereas 
people with a relatively high level of dopaminergic functioning (located on the descending, 
right half of the distribution), such as individuals scoring high in psychoticism (Colzato, 
Slagter, van den Wildenberg & Hommel, 2009), would actually be expected to suffer from 
better mood. Depending on which part of the distribu ion happens to be more strongly 
represented in a given sample, the corresponding study may find a positive, negative, or no 
relationship between mood and the given performance measure. This may explain why the 
evidence on the relationship between mood and performance seems so confusing and 
contradictory (Baas, De Dreu & Nijstad, 2008; Davis, 2009), especially if one considers that 
divergent and convergent thinking (which often are tr ated as equivalent indicators of 
creativity) seem to relate to dopaminergic functioning in different ways. In fact, our 
observations suggest that increasing dopaminergic supply can be expected to actually hamper 
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convergent thinking irrespective of the current level. If so, mood is unlikely to affect 
convergent and divergent thinking in the same fashion, which is one more reason to carefully 







Ashby, F. G., Isen, A. M., & Turken, A. U. (1999). A neuro-psychological theory of 
positive affect and its influence on cognition. Psychological Review, 106, 529-550. 
Baas, M. , De Dreu, C. K. W., & Nijstad, B. A. (2008). A meta-analysis of 25 years of 
mood-creativity research: Hedonic tone, activation, r regulatory focus? Psychological 
Bulletin, 134, 779-806 . 
Barbato, G., Ficca, G., Muscettola, G., Fichele, M.Beatrice, M., & Rinaldi, F. (2000). 
Diurnal variation in spontaneous eye-blink rate. Psychiatry Research, 93, 145-151. 
Bleuler, M. (1978). The schizophrenic disorders: Long-term patient and family studies. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Blin, O., Masson, G., Azulay, J. P., Fondarai, J., & Serratrice, G. (1990). Apomorphine-
induced blinking and yawning in healthy volunteers. British Journal of Clinical 
Pharmacology, 30, 769-773. 
Brown, R. T. (1989). Creativity: What are we to measure? In J. A. Glover, R. R. 
Ronning, & C. R. Reynolds (Eds.), Handbook of creativity (pp. 3-32). New York: Plenum. 
Carson, S.H., Peterson, J.B., & Higgins, D.M. (2003). Decreased latent inhibition is 
associated with increased creative achievement in high-functioning individuals. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 499-506. 
Cohen, J. D., & Servan-Schreiber, D. (1992). Context, cortex and dopamine: A 
connectionist approach to behavior and biology in schizophrenia. Psychological Review, 99, 
45-77. 
Colzato, L. S., & Hommel, B. (2009). Recreational use of cocaine eliminates inhibition of 
return. Neuropsychology, 23, 125-129. 
Colzato, L. S., Kool, W., & Hommel, B. (2008). Stress modulation of visuomotor 
binding. Neuropsychologia, 46, 1542-1548. 
Colzato, L. S., Slagter, H. A., van den Wildenberg, W.  & Hommel, B. (2009). Closing 
one's eyes to reality: Evidence for a dopaminergic basis of psychoticism from spontaneous 
eye blink rates. Personality and Individual Differences, 46, 377-380. 
73 
 
Colzato, L. S., van den Wildenberg, W., & Hommel, B. (2007). Impaired inhibitory 
control in recreational cocaine users. PLoS ONE, 2(11): e1143. 
Colzato, L. S., van den Wildenberg, W., & Hommel, B. (2008). Reduced spontaneous 
eye blink rates in recreational cocaine users: Evidence for dopaminergic hypoactivity. PLoS 
ONE, 3(10): e3461. 
Dauer, W., & Przedborski, S. (2003). Parkinson’s diease: mechanisms and models. 
Neuron, 39, 889-909. 
 Davis, K., Kahn, R., Ko, G., & Davidson, M. (1991). Dopamine in schizophrenia: A 
review and reconceptualization. American Journal of Psychiatry, 148, 1474-1486. 
Davis, M. A. (2009). Understanding the relationship between mood and creativity: A 
meta-analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 108, 25-38. 
Deuschel, G., & Goddemeier, C. (1998). Spontaneous and reflex activity of facial 
muscles in dystonia, Parkinson’s disease, and in normal subjects. Journal of Neurology and 
Neurosurgery Psychiatry, 64, 320-324. 
Dietrich, A. (2004). The cognitive neuroscience of creativity. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 11, 1011-1026. 
Dreisbach, G., Müller, J., Goschke, T.,  Strobel, A., Schulze, K., Lesch, K., & Brocke, B. 
(2005). Dopamine and cognitive control: The influenc  of spontaneous eyeblink rate and 
dopamine gene polymorphisms on perseveration and distractibility. Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 119, 483-490. 
Duncan, J., Seitz, R. J., Kolodny, J., Bor, D., Herzog, H., Ahmed, A., Newell, F. N., & 
Emslie, H. (2000). A neural basis for general intellig nce. Science, 289, 457-460. 
Egan, M. F., Goldberg, T. E., Kolachana, B. S., Callicott, J. H., Mazzanti, C. M., Straub, 
R. E., Goldman, D., & Weinberger, D. R. (2001). Effect of COMT Val108/158 Met genotype 
on frontal lobe function and risk for schizophrenia. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Science, USA, 98, 6917-6922. 
Eysenck, H. J. (1993). Creativity and personality: Suggestions for a theory. Psychological 
Inquiry, 4, 147-178. 
Frank, M. J., Seeberger, L. C. & O’Reilly, R. C. (2004). By carrot or by stick: Cognitive 
reinforcement learning in Parkinsonism. Science, 306, 1940-1943. 
74 
 
Freed, W. (1980). Eye-blink rates and platelet monoamine oxidase activity in chronic 
schizophrenic patients. Biological Psychiatry, 15, 329-332. 
Goldman-Rakic, P. S., Muly, E. C., III, & Williams, G. V. (2000). D1 receptors in 
prefrontal cells and circuits. Brain Research Review, 31, 295-301. 
Guilford, J. P. (1950). Creativity. American Psychologist, 5, 444-454. 
Guilford, J. P. (1967). The nature of human intelligence. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Heilman, K. M. (2005). Creativity and the brain. New York: Psychology Press. 
Hietala, J., Syvälahti, E., Vilkman, H., Vuorio, K., Räkköläinen, V., Bergman, J., 
Haaparanta, M., Solin, O., Kuoppamäki, M., Eronen, E., Ruotsalainen, U., & Salokangas, R. 
K. (1999) Depressive symptoms and presynaptic dopamine function in neuroleptic-naive 
schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research, 35, 41-50. 
Karson, C. N. (1983). Spontaneous eye-blink rates and dopaminergic systems. Brain, 
106, 643-653. 
Kleven, M. S., & Koek, W. (1996). Differential effects of direct and indirect dopamine 
agonists on eye blink rate in cynomolgus monkeys. Journal of Pharmacology and 
Experimental Therapeutics, 279, 1211-1219. 
Lindström, L. H., Gefvert, O., Hagberg, G., Lundberg, T., Bergström, M., Hartvig, P., & 
Långström, B. (1999). Increased dopamine synthesis rate in medial prefrontal cortex and 
striatum in schizophrenia indicated by l-(beta-11C) DOPA and PET. Biological Psychiatry, 
46, 681-688. 
Mednick, S. (1962). The associative basis of creativ  problem solving process. 
Psychological Review, 69, 200-232. 
 Moghaddam, B., & Jackson, M. (2004). Effect of stre s on prefrontal cortex function. 
Neurotoxicity Research, 6,73-78. 
Raven, J. C. (1965). Advanced Progressive Matrices Set I and II. London: H. K. Lewis. 
Reuter, M., Roth, S., Holve, K., & Hennig, J. (2006). Identification of first candidate 
genes for creativity: A pilot study. Brain Research, 1069, 190-197. 
Runco, M. (2007). Creativity theories and themes: research, development and practice. 
Burlington, MA: Elsevier Academic Press. 
Shukla, D. (1985). Blink rate as clinical indicator. Neurology, 35, 286. 
75 
 
Sternberg, R. J., Kaufman, J. C., & Pretz, J. E. (2002). The creativity conundrum: A 
propulsion model of kinds of creative contributions. New York: Psychology Press. 
Taylor, J. R., Elsworth, J. D., Lawrence, M. S., Sladek, J. R., Jr., Roth, R. H., & 
Redmond, D. E., Jr. (1999). Spontaneous blink rates correlate with dopamine levels in the 
caudate nucleus of MPTP-treated monkeys. Experimental Neurology, 158, 214-220. 
Volkow, N. D., Fowler, J. S., & Wang, G. J. (1999). Imaging studies on the role of 
dopamine in cocaine reinforcement and addiction in humans. Journal of 
Psychopharmacology, 13, 37-345. 
Williams, G.V., & Goldman-Rakic, P.S. (2002). Modulation of memory fields by 









































It is commonly assumed that positive mood improves human creativity and that the 
neurotransmitter dopamine might mediate this associati n. However, given the non-linear 
relation between dopamine and creative performance (Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2010), 
the impact of mood on creativity might depend on a given individual’s tonic dopamine level. 
Indeed, our findings suggest that: the association between tonic dopamine levels and 
creativity (divergent thinking) follows an inverted U-shape function (with best performance 
for medium levels); positive and negative mood inductions raise and lower the dopamine 
level, respectively; so that individuals with low dopamine levels benefit from positive mood 
more thanindividuals with medium or high levels. This observation challenges the generality 



















Creativity is arguablythe most potent human resource both for the advancement of 
mankind in general and people’s individual progress and success in daily life in particular. 
And yet, the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying creative behavior are poorly 
understood.Researchers agree that at least some fors of creativity vary with mood and two 
recent meta-analyses have concluded that performance i  tasks tapping divergent 
(brainstorm-like) thinking can be reliably improved by inducing positive mood (Baas, De 
Dreu & Nijstad, 2008; Davis, 2009). This conclusion fits with earlier considerations of Isen 
(1987), who claimed that positive affect impacts cognitive processing by (1) increasing the 
number of cognitive elements available for association; (2) defocusing attention so to 
increase the breadth of those elements treated as relevant to the problem; and (3) increasing 
cognitive flexibility. 
Exactly how positive mood manages to improve creativity is not yet clear, but in 
approaches that tackle this issue the neurotransmitter dopamine (possibly in concert with 
other neurotransmitter systems: Cools, Roberts & Robbins, 2008) plays a major role. 
Notably,Ashby, Isen, and Turken (1999) have pointed out that phasic changes indopamine 
levels, mood changes, and changes in creativity may be strongly interrelated. Their approach 
is inspired by insights into theneurobiology of reward,the encounter of which has been shown 
to induce both positive affect and phasic increasesof dopamine levels (e.g., Beninger, 1991; 
Bozarth, 1991; Philips, Blaha, Pfaus & Blackburn, 1992; Schultz,1992). Accordingly, Ashby 
and colleagues (1999) suggest that improved mood states are accompanied by phasic 
increases in dopaminergic supply provided by frontal and striatal pathways. These phasic 
increases might facilitate switching from one task set or item to another, thereby increasing 
cognitive flexibility in creativity task.This scenario is consistent with results fromneural-
network modeling (Ashby et al., 1999; Cohen& Servan-Schreiber, 1992) and the observation 
that divergent-thinking performance interacts with individual differences in the DRD2 TAQ 
IA gene—which affects receptor density in the striatal dopaminergic pathway (Reuter, Roth, 
Holve, & Hennig, 2006). Moreover, the personality trait of “seek”, which has been claimed 
to rely on dopaminergic pathways (Panksepp, 1998), has been reported to be positively 
related to creativity (Reuter et. al., 2005). 
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To assess the connection between creativity and dopamine more directly, Akbari 
Chermahini and Hommel (2010) related individual performance in creativity tasks to 
spontaneous eye-blink rates (EBRs), a well-established clinical marker of the individual 
dopamine level(Blin et al., 1990; Karson, 1983; Kleven & Koek, 1996). Divergent thinking 
did in fact covary with EBR but the function relating these two measures was nonlinear and 
followed an inverted-U shape. That is, individuals with mediumEBRs were performing better 
than individuals with low or high rates did. If we take EBRs as a marker of the current 
dopamine level (presumably integrating tonic and phasic levels), this has a number of rather 
serious implications that we set out to test in the present study.  
First, it suggests that increasing the dopamine level by means of a positive-mood 
induction is likely to facilitate divergent thinking in individuals with low tonic dopamine 
levels but not necessarily in individuals with medium or high levels. In other words, people 
with a low pre-experimental EBR would be expected to benefit from positive mood more 
than people with a medium or high pre-experimental EBR do.1 
Note that this reasoning holds only if positive-going mood can actually be considered to 
increase the phasic dopamine level in humans, which is yet to be demonstrated. Accordingly, 
our second hypothesis was that the experimentally induced positive or negative mood 
changes should be reflected in corresponding increases or decreases in EBR. 
Third, if we take both mood and EBR changes as reflections of phasic dopaminergic 
changes, the amount ofmood and EBR changes should be systematically related to changes in 
divergent thinking. That is, elevated mood and increased EBRs should be associated with 
                                                
1  Informal observations from our lab revealed that peopl  with very high EBR levels are rare in 
our student population and more often than not report to have family members with schizophrenia. 
This fits with the distribution of EBRs in Akbari Chermahini and Hommel’s (2010) and in the present 
study, where the EBRs of the majority of participants falls on the left, ascending part of the inverted 
U-shaped function relating EBR to divergent thinking. If we later in this article distinguish between 
below- and above-median EBRs, it should therefore be kept in mind that even above-median EBRs in 
the present study are actually representing medium EBRs in the population. In other words, the 





improved performance in divergent thinking, whereas negative-going mood and decreased 
EBRs would be more likely to be associated with impaired divergent thinking. 
We tested these hypotheses in the following way: Participants were first tested on 
general, pre-experimental mood (for both their general and their current mood state), on 
performance in divergent thinking, and on their pre-experimental EBR. Then two subgroups 
of participant underwent a positive-mood and negative-mood induction, respectively, before 




Eighty-one native Dutch students of Leiden University volunteered in exchange for 
course credit or pay. The study consisted of three phases. First, all participants filled out an 
inventory assessing their general mood (PANAS) and  mood inventory assessing their 
current mood state(MI1), before performing a divergent-creativity task (Alternate Uses Task: 
AUT1); finally, their spontaneous EBR were measured (EBR1). In the second phase, 43 
participants received a positive-mood induction while 38 participants received a negative-
mood induction. In the third phase, another version of the mood inventory (MI2) was filled 
out, EBR2 was measured, and another version of the creativity task was performed (AUT2). 
The order of the two versions of the mood inventory and the creativity task was counter-
balanced across participants. EBR2 was measured aftr mood induction while subject 
continually was thinking about either happy or sad memory.  
Positive and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS) 
The PANAS(Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) is a 20-item self-report mood scale that 
measures general (“how do you feel generally?”)positive affect (PA) and negative affect 
(NA). It comprises of 10 positive and 10 negative adjectives rated on a Likert scale from 1 
(very little or not at all) to 5 (very or extremely). We used a Dutch version of the scale with 
high internal consistencies for the PA (Cronbach's alpha=0.84) and the NA (Cronbach's 
alpha=0.80) subscale (cf., Hill et al., 2005). 
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Mood Inventory (MI) 
Two Dutch versions of a mood inventory (developed by Phillips, Bull, Adams& Fraser, 
2002, and similar to the scale of Isen, Daubman & Nowicki, 1987) were used to assess 
current mood in the first and the third phase of the experiment. Three of the five items of this 
inventory assess the hedonic quality of affect (Phillips et al., 2002). One version (Cronbach's 
alpha=0.75) used the following adjective pairs (Dutch words are given in parentheses) to 
measure valence: happy–sad (blij-verdrietig), peaceful–anxious (verdig-angstig), and 
carefree–serious (zorgeloos-serieus). The second version (Cronbach's alpha=0.85) used th  
pairs: positive–negative (positief-negatief), calm–uptight (kalm-opgewonden), and bright–
dispirited (helder-serieus). Positive and negative words were presented on the left and right 
side of a page, respectively. Nine-point Likert scales separated the words of each pair and 
participants were asked to rate their current mood state (following Phillips et al., 2002). For 
analytical purposes the mood scores were reversed and then totaled, so that higher scores 
indicated more positive mood.  
Alternate Uses Task (AUT) 
Following Guilford (1967), participants were asked to write down as many possible uses 
for a common household item as they can within 5 min. Two different items were used: 
cupand pencil, with the order being balanced across participants. Responses can be scored 
with respect to four aspects (flexibility, originality, fluency, and elaboration). However, 
given that flexibility is most strongly and reliably related to EBR measures (Akbari 
Chermahini & Hommel, 2010) we focused on the flexibility score, which is derived from the 
number of different categories being used for each item. 
Eye Blink Rate (EBR) 
A BioSemi ActiveTwo system (BioSemi Inc., Amsterdam) was used to record the EBR. 
We recorded with two horizontal (one left, one right) and two vertical (one upper, one lower 
of right eye) Ag-AgCl electrodes, for 6 min eyes-open segments under resting conditions. 
The vertical electrooculogram (EOG), which recorded the voltage difference between two 
electrodes placed above and below the left eye, was used to detect eye blinks. The horizontal 
EOG, which recorded the voltage difference between el ctrodes placed lateral to the external 
canthi, was used to measure horizontal eye movements. As spontaneous EBR is stable during 
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daytime but increases in the evening (around 8:30 pm, see Babarto et al., 2000), we never 
registered after 5 pm. We also asked participants to avoid smoking before the recording. 
Participants were comfortably sitting in front of a blank poster with a cross in the center, 
located about 1m from the participant. The participant was alone in the room and asked to 
look at the cross in a relaxed state to record EBR1. After mood induction (either positive or 
negative) EBR2 was recorded. The individual EBR was c lculated by dividing the total 
number of eye blinks during the 6-min measurement interval by 6. 
Mood Induction 
We used the common mental-imagination procedure (e.g., Bodenhausen et al., 1994; 
Baas et al., 2008; DeSteno et al., 2004; Phillips et al., 2002; Strack et al., 1985) to induce 
positive and negative mood. Participants were asked to write down a couple of sentences 
about an event of their life that made them happy(in a calm, relaxed way) or sad(in a calm, 
non-angry way),respectively, for 5 min. Calmness waemphasized to keep the two emotional 
states comparable regarding activation and arousal. EBR2 was recorded right after the mood 
induction; participants were asked to stop writing but to keep thinking about the event during 
the measurementinterval. The session was completed by filling in the MI2. 
 
RESULTS 
Comparability of groups 
Aset of independent t-test were conducted to check whether the two experimental groups 
were comparable before undergoing the mood induction. There was not any hint to any pre-
experimental difference between the two groups with respect to either the positive or 
negative subscale of PANAS, and the hedonic-valence scores computed from the MI1, nor 
did any of these scales correlate with EBR1, all ps>.05. Table 1 provides the 
relevantinformation about the mood states in two experimental groups and the four 
subgroups.Interestingly, thelack of a correlation between EBR1 and pre-experimental mood 





Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations for Pre-experimental General Mood States (PANAS: 
positive and negative scales), and Current Mood States (only hedonic valence score) Before (MI1) 
and After (MI2) Mood Induction in the Two Experimental Groups, and Four Subgroups, as a 




State Mood Index 
 
 









(n=43)    (n=21) (n=22) (n=38) (n=19) (n=19) 
PANAS–PA 
 
M 34.1 33.1 35.1 34.1 33.2 35.1 
S.
D. 
4.5 4.9 3.9 5.5 4.6 6.1 
PANAS-NA 
M 16.1 16.2 16.4 16.2 16.4 16.1 
S.
D. 
4.8 4.9 4.9 6.1 7 5.4 
   MI1 
M 18.06 17.54 18.61 19.86 18.44 20.77 
S.
D. 
3.08 2.57 3.5 4.05 4.63 3.24 
   MI2 
M 20.95 20.36 21.57 13.36 13.05 13.66 
S.
D. 
3.06 2.93 3.13 4.7 4.26 5.21 
 
Note: PANAS-PA, PANAS positive affect subscale; PANAS-NA, PANAS negative affect subscale.   
 
 
Two more sets of independent t-tests assessed whether the groups were comparable with 
regard to the pre-experimental EBR1 and the flexibility score in the creativity task before the 




Another set of paired-sample t-tests on the hedonic valence score in MI1 and MI2 served 
to check whether the mood manipulation worked. As expected, participants were 
significantly more happy after positive-mood induction than before (M=20.95 vs. 18.11), 
t(42)= 5.74, p< 0.001,η²= 0.44, and significantly less happy after negative-mood induction 
(M=13.07 vs.19.65 ), t(37)=7.76, p<0.001. η²= 0.62.This suggests that the mental-imagery 
procedure was effective in inducing the respective mood states. 
Mood and Creativity 
Paired sample t-tests assessed the impact of mood induct on on performance in the 
creativity task by comparing flexibility scores before and after the mood manipulation. As 
expected, the induction of positive mood enhanced fl xibility (M=7.1 vs. 5.7), t(42)=3.26, p 
< 0.01,η²= 0.20. The induction of negative mood reduced flexibility ( M=5.52 vs. 5.26), but 
this effect was not significant,t(37)=0.84,p> 0.05,η²= 0.02. The correlation between change 
in creativity (AUT2-AUT1: flexibility score) and change in mood (MI2-MI: hedonic 
valence) was positive and reliable, r = 0.44, p < 0.001, suggesting that the degree of mood 
change statistically predicts the direction and degre  of change in creativity. 
Mood and EBR 
Paired sample t-test revealed systematic changes in EBR after mood induction:As 
expected, the induction of positive mood led to a significant increase in EBR (M=18.79 vs. 
14.1), t(42)=3.8, p< 0.001,η²= 0.26. Negative-mood induction reduced EBR (M=16.78 
vs.17.39) but this effect was not significant, t(37)=0.64, p> 0.05,η²= 0.01.Moreover, the 
correlation between change in EBR (EBR2-EBR1) and change in mood (MI2-MI: hedonic 
valence) was positive and reliable, and the best fit was obtained for a linear function (Figure 
1) relating EBR changes to mood changes, r = 0.35, p = 0.003, suggesting that the degree of 
mood change was associated with proportional phasic increases and decreases of the 


















Figure 1: Correlation Between change in Eye Blink Rate (EBR2-EBR1) and Change in Current 
Mood State (MI2-MI1: hedonic valence) as a Function of Positive and Negative Mood Induction.   
 
Interestingly, the impact of positive mood on EBR was mediated by the pre-experimental 
EBR level. Participants with a pre-experimentally low (i.e., below-median) EBR showeda 
pronounced and highly significant increase in EBR after positive mood induction from 7.57 
to 14.14, t(21) = 3.27, p = 0.004, η²= 0.34, whereas participants with a pre-experimentally 
high (i.e., above-median) EBR only tended to show reliable change in EBR (from 20.9 to 
23.5),t(20) = 2.05, p = 0.054, η²=0.19. 
Creativity and EBR 
The relationship between performance in the creativity task (AUT1: flexibility score)and 
EBR1followed an inverted U-shapedfunction (Figure 2, quadratic fit= 0.36, p=.005), which 
confirms our previous observations (Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2010).The correlation 
between change in EBR (EBR2-EBR1) and change in creativity performance (AUT2-AUT1: 
flexibility score) was positive and reliable, r = 0.19, p = 0.047, suggesting that the degree of 
flexibility change was proportional to the phasic in reases and decreases of the individual 
dopamine level. 
CHANGE IN EYE BLINK RATE 
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Figure 2: Performance in the creativity task (flexibility score) as a function of spontaneous eye blink 
rate (EBR) per min. Regression line for best (quadratic) fit.  
 
Interactions between Mood, Creativity, and EBR 
Importantly, the experimentally induced mood changes had the predicted impact on EBR 
and creativity: Individuals were becoming more creative to the degree that the positive-mood 
induction increased their EBR, r=.29, p=.03(Figure 3, line: P), and tended to become less 
creative to the degree that the negative-mood induction decreased their EBR, r=-.23, p=.09 
(Figure 3, line: N).This pattern suggests that the extent of phasic increases and decreases of 

















































Figure 3: Mood-induced change in creativity performance (creativity score post minus creativity 
score pre mood induction) as a function of the mood-induced change in spontaneous eye blink rates 
(EBRs). Empty circles and regression line N for participants with negative-mood induction; filled 
circles and regression line P for participants with positive-mood induction. 
 
Again, the mood-induced effect was contingent on the pre-experimental EBR1. As Figure 
4a shows, positive mood increases EBR mainly in low (i.e., below-median) EBR1 
individuals but not so much in high-EBR1 participants—even though the distribution of 
EBRs (see Figure 2) does not suggest that this might be due to a ceiling effect. Likewise, as 
shown in Figure 4b, the induction of positive mood improved performance in the creativity 
task onlyin low-EBR1 individuals (from 5.8 to 8.0 categories, t(21)=3.54, p=.002, η²= 























































































Figure 4: Change in spontaneous Eye Blink Rate (EBR) (a), and performance in creativity task 
(divergent thinking: flexibility) (b), as a function of mood induction (either positive or negative), and 





The aim of the present study was to investigate the relationship between mood, creativity, 
and phasic dopamine changes as reflected in EBRs. The mood induction manipulation work 
as expected, even though the induction of positive mood was more effective than the 
induction of negative mood. As implied by our second hypothesis, positive- and negative-
going mood changes were accompanied by systematic increases and decreases of EBR, 
respectively. This suggests that EBR is a sensitive m asure of mood-related phasic 
dopaminergic changes. Moreover, we were able to fully replicate the inverted U-shaped 
function relating flexibility in divergent thinking to pre-experimental EBR, first reported by 
Akbari Chermahini and Hommel (2010). If we assume that pre-experimental EBR (i.e., 
EBR1) reflects the individual tonic dopamine level, this replication confirms that EBR is a 
reliable index of tonic dopamine levels as well. 
As implied by our third hypothesis, all three factors under investigation were 
systematically related to each other—even though, again, these relations were more 
pronounced in the context of positive-mood induction. Flexibility in divergent thinking was 
facilitated or tended to be impaired through the induction of positive or negative mood, 
respectively, and the degree of this improvement was predicted by the individual degree to 
which the mood induction manipulation was successful. Likewise, EBR increased or tended 
to decrease through the induction of positive or negative mood, respectively, and the degree 
of this phasic change was again predicted by the degree to which the mood induction 
manipulation was successful. Finally, the positive and negative changes in EBR predicted the 
increase or decrease of flexibility in divergent thinking, suggesting that phasic increases and 
decreases in dopamine facilitated or impaired divergent creativity, respectively. Hence, all 
three factors seem to be related to each other exactly as predicted, and even the asymmetry 
between the effects of the positive- vs. negative-mood induction is equally reflected in all 
three measures. 
According to our first hypothesis, this interrelationship—together with the fully 
replicated inverted U-shaped relationship between EBR and creativity—suggest that 
individuals with low tonic dopamine levels might benefit more from the induction of positive 
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mood than individuals with medium or high levels do. Indeed, mood-induced improvement 
of divergent thinking was only observed in individuals with a pre-experimentally low EBR 
and a presumably corresponding low tonic dopamine lev l. Not only does this fit with the 
nonlinear relation between EBR in divergent thinking reported by Akbari Chermahini and 
Hommel (2010), it is also likely to explain why unreliable findings and failures to replicate 
are still abundant in studies on the connection betwe n mood and creativity (Baas et al., 
2008; Davis, 2009). 
Taken together, our findings support the assumption that phasic changes in dopamine 
levels provide the common currency underlying the relationship between mood and 
creativity, as suggested by Ashby et al. (1999) and others, and they provide the hitherto most 
direct evidence for the underlying interrelationship between mood, creativity, and dopamine. 
In particular, elevated mood seems indeed to increase the dopamine level and to improve 
creativity as assessed by our divergent-thinking task. At the same time, however, there is 
evidence that the reliability and, presumably, the direction of the impact of mood and 
associated phasic dopamine changes depend on the individual tonic dopamine level (but not 
the basic mood level!). This questions the generality of claims regarding the positive impact 
of mood on creativity and calls for closer consideration of individual differences. As our 
findings demonstrate, better mood may or may not facilit te (and may in some cases even 
impair) creative performance of a given individual. Depending on the specific characteristics 
of a given sample, this complication may well conceal the true connections between 
creativity, mood, and dopaminergic activity in empirical studies and applied settings. 
In the light of our findings, a number of further questions present themselves. For 
instance, it remains to be seen whether a comparable interrelationship exists between mood, 
dopamine, and convergent thinking—which apparently re ates to tonic dopamine levels in 
different, and in some sense opposite, ways than divergent thinking does (Akbari Chermahini 
& Hommel, 2010). Recently we observed that engaging in divergent thinking leads to more 
negative mood (Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2011), which would fit with this 
expectation. Moreover, it seems important to clarify the functional relationship between 
mood and phasic dopaminergic changes. After all, mood is a concept that relates to a 
personal level of description and relates to a person having and experiencing it. In contrast, 
changes in dopaminergic activity refer to the system  level of description, which may or may 
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not correspond to personal-level concepts in a one-t -one fashion. Hence, it would be 
important to understand whether and to what degree dopaminergic changes are the neural 
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Creative mood swings:  


















This chapter is published as: Akbari Chermahini, S., & Hommel, B. (in press). Creative 






Increasing evidence suggests that emotions affect cognitive processes. Recent approaches 
have also considered the opposite: that cognitive processes might affect people's mood. Here 
we show that performing and, to a lesser degree, prparing for a creative thinking task 
induces systematic mood swings: Divergent thinking led to a more positive mood whereas 
convergent thinking had the opposite effect. This pattern suggests that thought processes and 
























In contrast to the commonsense concept of affect and reason as antagonistic factors that 
compete for the control of our thoughts and actions, recent research has revealed evidence for 
numerous types of fruitful cooperation between affectiv  and cognitive processes. For 
instance, positive mood and affect have been shown t  facilitate associative (Bar, 2009) and 
semantic priming (Hanze & Hesse, 1993), to enhance the recall of happy memories (Teasdale 
& Fogarty, 1979), and to support the processing of l bal perceptual information (Gasper & 
Clore, 2002); whereas negative mood and affect have been found to narrow the focus of 
attention (Rowe, Hirsh & Anderson, 2007), facilitating analytical processing, causal 
reasoning, and reliance on systematic processing (Pham, 2007), and to support forgetting 
(MacLeod, 2002; Bäuml & Kuhbandner, 2009). A particularly close relationship seems to 
exist between mood and creative thinking. Various athors have assumed that positive mood 
enhances creativity (e.g., Isen, 1999; Hirt, Melton, McDonald & Harackiewicz, 1996), and 
numerous findings are consistent with this idea (for reviews, see Baas, De Dreu & Nijstad, 
2008; Davis, 2009). At the same time, however, the typ  and nature of this interaction is not 
well understood and mediating factors like type of task (Davis, 2009), motivational set (Baas 
et al., 2008), and individual differences (Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2011) can play 
decisive roles. Nevertheless, it seems clear that some sort of link exists between positive and 
negative mood on the one hand and creative thought processes on the other. 
One idea regarding how mood and creative processes might interact considers mood as 
the cause and changes in creativity as effect. For instance, Ashby, Isen, and Turken (1999) 
assumed that mood creates particular brain states that facilitate or interfere with particular 
processing operations that are required for creativ thinking. More recently, however, authors 
have also considered the possibility of a more recipro al relationship between affective and 
cognitive processes (Bar, 2009; Gray, 2004; Gross, 2002; Salovey, Mayer & Caruso, 2002), 
which would allow creative thought to affect mood. For instance, Bar (2009) suggested an 
interactive relation between mood and cognitive control: The broad associative activation 
that is thought to coming along with positive mood may help gaining a broader perspective, 
which again might make people happier. Indeed, Srinivasan and Hanif (in press) reported 
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that attending to the global aspect of visual stimuli facilitates the processing of happy as 
compared to sad faces while attending to the local aspects facilitates the processing of sad 
faces. Applied to the interaction between mood and creative thinking, this suggests that 
particular mood states may not only facilitate or hinder particular types of thought processes 
but some types of thought processes might also facilitate or even induce particular mood 
states.  
In the present study, we tested this possibility by presenting participants with creative-
thinking tasks and assessing whether this would lea to systematic mood changes. As 
divergent and convergent thinking have been attributed to different types of cognitive 
processes (Guilford, 1967) and given that they seem to rely on different neurocognitive states 
(Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2010), we tested the impact of divergent thinking (assessed 
by the Alternate Uses Task, AUT: Guilford, 1967) and convergent thinking (assessed by the 
Remote Associates Task, RAT: Mednick, 1962) on mood separately by means of a between-
subjects design.  
Divergent-thinking tasks require participants to generate as many target-related responses 
as possible, and the target constrains the selection of possible responses rather weakly. An 
example is Guilford’s (1967) AUT, which requires participants to generate as many uses for 
a simple object, such as a pen, they can think of. Even though divergent thinking can be 
considered as just one of a number of component processes underlying creative acts 
(Guilford, 1967; Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel & Baas, 2010; Wallas, 1926), recent reviews 
have revealed that the connection between divergent thi king and affect and mood is 
particularly strong and positive (Baas et al., 2008; Davis, 2009). Hence, more positive affect 
and mood improves divergent thinking. According to the reciprocity hypothesis under test, 
this suggests the divergent-thinking task can be expected to induce a more positive mood 
state. 
In contrast to divergent thinking, convergent thinking requires focusing onto one possible 
response per item and thus calls for a strongly constrai ed search process. As an example, in 
Mednick’s (1962) RAT participants are presented with three concepts per trial, such as 
“hair”, “stretch” and “time”, and they are to identify the one concept that fits with all three in 
terms of association, meaning, or abstraction—such as “long” in the example. As we have 
argued elsewhere(Hommel, in press; Hommel, Akbari Chermahini, van den Wildenberg & 
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Colzato, 2011), succeeding in this task is likely to require a task set that in some sense is 
opposite to that implied by divergent thinking. Indee , recently we were able to demonstrate 
that mixing convergent and divergent thinking tasks with other laboratory tasks results in a 
double dissociation: while engaging in convergent thinking facilitates subsequent 
performance in tasks that require focusing on relevant and excluding irrelevant information, 
divergent thinking facilitates subsequent performance in tasks that require the distribution of 
processing resources (Hommel et al., 2011). If we assume that opposite control states are 
accompanied by opposite mood states (for reasons that we elaborate in the Discussion), the 
observation that divergent thinking is related to positive mood would imply that convergent 
thinking is associated with negative mood. Accordingly, the reciprocity hypothesis would 
suggest that the convergent-thinking task induces a more negative mood state. 
A second factor we considered was whether participants were only expecting to carry out 
the thinking task or whether they actually carried it out. This manipulation was motivated by 
informal observations of ours that participants often show affective responses to the mere 
announcement of the tasks that we commonly use to assess creative thinking (the AUT and 
the RAT). A similar reaction can be observed when intelligence or mathematical tasks are 
being announced, irrespective of the eventual score of the participant. This suggests that such 
reactions are not reflecting the individual ability or performance on the task but some kind of 
stereotypical response that may or may not be related to particular task characteristics. To 
dissociate such stereotypical and/or expectation-driven mood changes from changes that 
result from the actual processes engaged by the task, we had two groups of participants carry 
out the divergent or convergent thinking task and two other groups just waiting to perform 
these tasks (for about the same duration) after having been instructed how to carry it out. 
 
METHOD 
Participants, Design, and Procedure 
Eighty-four students from Leiden University volunteer d in exchange for course credit or 
pay. Participants were informed that they were participating in a study on problem solving. 
They were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental groups (22 to each of the 
102 
 
performance groups and 20 to each of the preparation gr ups). Participants underwent four 
tasks or measurements: an inventory assessing their general mood (PANAS), a mood 
inventory (MI1) assessing their current feeling state before working on the creativity task, 
(preparation for) a creativity task (either AUT or RAT), and another version of the MI (MI2) 
to assess their current feeling state after working o  the creativity task. The order of the two 
versions was balanced across participants. 
 
Table 1: Sequence of Events for the Four Experimental Groups. 
 
Group Pre-Test Preparation Execution Post-Test 
DT PANAS MI1 AUT AUT MI2 
pDT PANAS MI1 AUT  MI2 
CT PANAS MI1 RAT RAT MI2 
pCT PANAS MI1 RAT  MI2 
 
Note: PANAS=Positive and Negative Affect Scales; MI1=Mood Inventory (1st); AUT=Alternate 
Uses Task; RAT=Remote Association Task; MI2=Mood Inventory (2nd). 
 
The members of the four experimental groups all worked through the PANAS, the MI1, 
and the final MI2, but they differed with respect to the creativity task (see Table 1). The first 
group (DT) worked on a divergent-thinking task (AUT), which calls for the broad association 
on a particular theme (object use). The second group (pDT) was instructed to prepare for 
working on the same task, but the task was never actually performed. Analogously, the third 
group (CT) worked on a convergent-thinking task (RAT), which calls for finding one single 
correct response, whereas the fourth group (pCT) was instructed to prepare for working on 
the convergent-thinking task without performing it. To keep the timing comparable across 
the four groups, the members of groups pDT and pCT were to talk about the experiment and 
the instruction of either DT or CT with the experimenter for 5 minutes instead of performing 




Positive and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS) 
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) 
is a 20-item self-report mood scale that provides a general measure (“how do you feel 
generally?”) of positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA). The PANAS consists of 10 
positive adjectives (such as “interested”, “alert”, “excited”) and 10 negative adjectives (such 
as “disinterested”, “upset”, “guilty”) rated on a Likert scale from 1 (very little or not at all) to 
5 (very or extremely). Our Dutch version of the PANAS had high internal consistencies for 
both the PA (Cronbach's alpha=0.84) and the NA (Cronbach's alpha=0.80) subscale (cf., Hill 
et al., 2005). 
 
Mood Inventory (MI) 
Two Dutch versions of the mood inventory employed by Phillips, Bull, Adams, and 
Fraser (2002) and Oaksford, Morris, Grainger, and Williams (1996), and similar to the scale 
of Isen, Daubman, and Nowicki (1987), were used to assess current mood before and after 
preparing for and (in groups DT and CT) performing the creativity task. The items of this 
inventory assess three types of mood indicators (thee edonic, one physical arousal, and one 
worry measure; Phillips et al., 2002). One version (Cronbach's alpha=0.75) used the 
following adjective pairs (Dutch words are given in parentheses): happy–sad (blij-verdrietig), 
active–exhausted (actief-uitgeput), peaceful–anxious (verdig-angstig), carefree–serious 
(zorgeloos-serieus), and energetic–somber (energiek–sloom). The second version 
(Cronbach's alpha=0.85) used the pairs: positive–negative (positief-negatief), lively–tired 
(levendig-vermoeid), calm–uptight (kalm-opgewonden), bright–dispirited (helder-serieus), 
and cheerful–low (vrolijk-sloom). Positive and negative words were presented on the left and 
right side of a page, respectively. Nine-point Likert scales separated the words of each pair. 
Participants were asked to rate their current mood state (following Phillips et al., 2002). For 
further analyses, the mood scores were reversed for five items and then totaled for hedonic 
valence (items 1, 3, and 4), so that higher scores indicated more positive mood. Physical 
arousal (item 2), and worry (item 5) were scored separately. 
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Alternate Uses Task (divergent thinking) 
In this task (based on Guilford, 1967, and translated into Dutch), participants were asked 
to list as many possible uses for a common household item (cup) as they can within 5 min. 
Responses can be scored with respect to four aspects (flexibility, originality, fluency, and 
elaboration), but given that flexibility seems to be the by far most reliable aspect (Akbari 
Chermahini & Hommel, 2010; Ashby, Valentin, & Turken, 2002), we considered flexibility 
scores only—which were derived from the number of different categories being used by the 
participant. 
 
Remote Association Task (convergent thinking) 
Mednick’s Remote Associates Test (Mednick, Mednick, & Mednick, 1964), (considered 
as a convergent thinking test) was originally designed in accord with S.Mednick's (1962) 
associative theory of creativity. Based on this theory, the creative thinking process consists in 
the formation of associative elements into new combinations which either meet specified 
requirements or are in some way useful. The original test consists of 30 items (Mednick, 
1968; Mednick & Mednick, 1967). Each item consists of three words that can be associated 
in one of several ways (e.g., time, hair, and stretch), such as forming a compound word or 
identifying a semantic associate (long). The items are constructed in such a way that only e 
solution is possible and that the first solution that comes to mind is commonly incorrect—
which is why the test is taken to assess “remote” associations. Our Dutch version of the test 
comprised of 30 items and was found to be reasonably reliable (Cronbach's alpha=0.85). In 




Performance in the AUT (flexibility score: M=5.5, SD=2.24) and the RAT (M=7.09, 
SD=3.25) was good and comparable to performance in other studies using these task versions 





Table 2 provides an overview of the general mood state  in the four experimental groups, 
as measured by the PANAS inventory. Two one-way ANOVAs with group as between-
subjects factor did not reveal any hint to pre-experim ntal differences between the four 
groups with respect to either the positive or negative subscale of PANAS. The groups were 
thus comparable.  
 
Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations for Pre-experimental General Mood States (positive and 
negative scales) in the Four Experimental Groups. 
 
 




DT pDT CT pCT 
(n=22) (n=20) (n=22) (n=20) 
PANAS–P 
M 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 
SD .3 .5 .5 .5 
PANAS-N 
M 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.7 
SD .5 .5 .5 .6 
 


























Figure 1: Mood (panel A) and subjective physical arousal (panel B) as a function of creativity task 
(divergent thinking=DT, convergent thinking-CT), activity (performing and preparing the creativity 
task), and timepoint (before vs. after preparation or performance of the creativity task) 
 
Task-induced mood changes 
Mood changes were analyzed by means of three sets of three-way ANOVAs on the MI1 
and MI2, using the hedonic valence score, the physical arousal score, and the worry score as 







(performing and preparing) served as between-subjects fa tors and timepoint (before vs. after 
the preparation or performance of the creativity task: MI1 vs. MI2) as within-subjects factor. 
The alpha level was 0.05. 
Our actual hypotheses were tested by means of the hedonic valence ANOVA. There were 
only two reliable effects: an interaction between creativity task and timepoint, F(1,80) = 
17.95, p < 0.001, η2= 0.18, that was modified by a three-way interaction with activity, 
F(1,80) = 4.06, p < 0.05, η2= .05. Separate ANOVAs showed that the task-by-timepoint 
interaction was reliable with performance, F (1, 42) = 17.76, p < 0.01, η2= 0.30, and but not 
with preparation, F(1,38) = 2.85, p >0.05, η2=0.07. As shown in Figure 1A, performing and, 
to a lesser degree, preparing for the DT task induce  a more positive mood whereas 
performing and, to a lesser degree, preparing for the CT task induced a more negative mood. 
Interestingly, this pattern did not change when the individual performance in the creativity 
tasks was entered into the equation (as covariate) in the analyses of the performance groups 
(DT and CT), which rules out an account in terms of task difficulty and/or stress. 
The analysis of the physical arousal score revealed only one reliable effect: an interaction 
between creativity task and timepoint, F(1,80) =6.11, p < 0.05, η2 =0.07, even though the 
three-way interaction with activity approached signif cance, F(1,80) =3.24, p = 0.07, η2 = 
0.04. Separate ANOVAs showed that the task-by-timepoint interaction was reliable with 
performance, F(1,42) =7.43, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.15, but not with preparation, F(1,38)<1. As 
shown in Figure 1B, the outcome showed the same patt rn as the hedonic valence data. The 




The results are clear-cut. Most importantly, carrying out a task that requires creative 
thinking affects people's mood. This provides considerable support for the idea that mood 
and cognition are not only related, but that this relation is fully reciprocal (Bar, 2009; Gray, 
2004; Gross, 2002; Salovey et al., 2002). Moreover, divergent and convergent thinking 
impact mood in opposite ways: divergent thinking is improving one's mood while convergent 
thinking is lowering it. This dissociation is consistent with Akbari Chermahini and 
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Hommel’s (2010) observation that both types of thinking are related to one's dopamine 
level—the common currency that apparently mediates th  interaction—but that these two 
relationships follow rather different functions. It also fits with the observation of Hommel et 
al. (2011) that convergent and divergent thinking support two different types of cognitive 
control. Finally, mood changes were particularly pronounced with actual task performance 
but mere preparation was also effective to some degree. The latter observation might suggest 
that divergent thinking and convergent thinking tasks evoke different, apparently even 
opposite stereotypical reactions which, as in intellig nce tasks, do not seem to reflect 
individual performance and, thus, objective task characteristics. However, this effect might 
also indicate that preparing for divergent versus convergent thinking foreshadows the 
stronger performance-related effect, for instance because preparation involves the pre-
activation of the very task-specific sets or states that are responsible for the mood swings that 
we observed. In any case, however, actually carrying out the task and, thus, the related 
thinking operations further boosts the task-specific mood changes to a degree that goes 
beyond possible stereotypical responses.  
From a broader perspective, the outcome pattern of our study might be interpreted in 
three different ways. According to the first, the divergent-thinking task is just “more fun”. 
However, even though this account seems particularly intuitive (and is shared by many 
colleagues to whom we reported our findings), closer consideration reveals that its logical 
structure and actual meaning is less clear. To render this “fun” explanation more than a 
theoretically meaningless re-description of the findings, it would be necessary to identify 
some sort of factor that is responsible for the resulting fun or perceived pleasantness. The 
task’s physical or structural characteristics are unlikely candidates, as it would be difficult to 
argue that being presented with three target stimuli and/or producing one response per trial is 
depressing while encountering one stimulus and/or pr ducing a number of responses per trial 
is pleasant (especially if one considers that participants in the two preparation groups 
produced even more output in the filler task). More plausible would be a factor that also 
considers how participants deal with the characteristics of the tasks. On the one hand, these 
might be motivational factors reflecting the type and degree of challenge the different tasks 
are posing, and the motivational state this challenge creates. On the other hand, it might be 
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more cognitive factors that reflect the kind of task sets the different tasks require. We will 
discuss these two possibilities in turn. 
According to a motivational account, the different emotional consequences of the two 
tasks might reflect differences in their demand characteristics. For instance, one may 
consider the convergent-thinking task more difficult than the divergent-thinking task (e.g., 
because it constrains responses more and/or because it tak s longer to find a correct solution) 
and assume that easier tasks induce more positive, and more difficult tasks more negative 
mood. Even though this interpretation may seem intuit vely plausible, closer consideration 
reveals that it runs into a number of theoretical and empirical problems. For one, people are 
known to be more motivated by tasks that are difficult but solvable than by easy tasks (for an 
overview, see Weiner, 1980). If we assume that combining high motivation and success is 
associated with positive mood, this suggests that, if nything, participants should show more 
positive mood after performing the convergent-thinking task. A similar prediction could be 
made based on reward-related brain processes. It is known that reward-induced brain 
responses are more pronounced the more unexpected succes  in a task is (Schultz, 1998). 
Given that reward is commonly assumed to lead to positive affect, this would suggest that 
identifying a correct response in a more difficult task is more rewarding and, thus, induces 
more positive mood than doing so in an easier task. Moreover, it makes sense to assume that 
the subjective difficulty is negatively correlated to the individual success. If so, participants 
that are performing more poorly in the convergent-thinking task should exhibit more 
negative-going mood than better-performing participants. However, we have seen that 
entering individual performance into the analysis dd not explain the task-by-timepoint 
interaction, which does not seem to support an account in terms of subjective difficulty. 
This motivational interpretation considers the observed changes in mood mere 
byproducts of task difficulty or related task characteristics without a particular functional role 
or meaning. However, it is also possible that the mood changes reflect the way the cognitive 
system is optimizing itself for the task at hand. The concept of mood refers to the personal 
level of analysis and implies a person having or being in the particular mood. At a systems 
level of analysis, this “being in a particular mood” implies the existence of a specific 
functional or neural state that corresponds to, andis correlated with this phenomenal 
experience. The probably most systematic correlate of mood changes are changes in the 
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individual dopamine level (Ashby et al., 1999)—even though other neurotransmitter systems 
are also likely to be involved. Indeed, there is evid nce from animal and human studies 
suggesting that the processing of positive and negative events is correlated with increases and 
decreases of the current dopamine level, respectively (Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2011; 
Schultz, 1998). This implies that being in good or bad mood can be considered the 
experiential reflection of a brain state that, among ther things, comprises of an elevated or 
reduced dopamine level, respectively—mood and dopamine levels are thus two sides of the 
same coin. Interestingly, the current dopamine level is systematically related to performance 
in convergent- and divergent-thinking tasks: while convergent thinking benefits from a low 
level, divergent thinking is best with a medium-to-high level (Akbari Chermahini & 
Hommel, 2010). This implies that the optimal preparation for a convergent-thinking task 
would indeed consist in reducing the dopamine level—which would be accompanied by a 
more negative-going mood (Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2011)—while the optimal 
preparation for a divergent-thinking task would consists in elevating the dopamine level—
which would be accompanied by positive-going mood. In other words, the task-related mood 
changes we observed might be the experiential reflection of adaptive neuromodular changes 
that make sure that the cognitive system is optimally prepared for the task at hand.  
We admit these are only speculations that call for further investigation. But they suggest 
the interesting possibility that people might be able to self-regulate their current dopamine 
level by adapting mood-related brain states to the cognitive requirements of the present task. 
From a more functional perspective, this would fit the idea that mood and cognitive control 
are more tightly related than commonly thought (Bar, 2009). Mood may thus not necessarily, 
or not only, be considered a separable cause of particul  control states but, rather, as the 
phenomenal expression of having such control states in place. In other words, different 
control states may feel differently. As our observations suggest, establishing and/or 
maintaining a focused, exclusive control state may come along with rather negative mood 
whereas a more distributed control state comes with rather positive mood. 
If true, this has two interesting implications. Theor tically speaking, it would support 
approaches to human emotion that consider the phenom al side effects of emotions—how 
an emotion makes one feel—less important than their functional implications—what an 
emotion does for our information processing. According to such approaches, different 
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emotions go along with different types of readiness for particular types of actions (Frijda, 
2007; James, 1884), such as fear and avoidance behavior (Le Doux, 1996). Our present 
findings suggest that this may not only hold for overt actions and action preparation but also 
for more general cognitive-control states. Practically speaking, the apparently close link 
between particular control states and particular mood states has the advantage of providing 
cues to assess the control state a given person is currently in. That is, someone's degree of 
positive or negative mood, and systematic changes th rein, might provide important 
information about whether he or she is in a more focused or a more distributed control state. 
Given that mood states are commonly communicated throug  a broad range of perceivable 
cues, such as facial expression, body posture, or verbal style, this raises the exciting 
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Five experiments sought to characterize the cognitive-control states driving convergent 
and divergent thinking. The creativity tasks served as primes that were expected to exert 
specific effects on cognitive control in other, unrelated probe tasks. Experiments 1-3 showed 
that convergent-thinking primes made conflict resoluti n in a global-local task, a semantic 
Stroop and a Simon task more efficient than divergent-thinking primes. Experiment 4 
showed no relation between either prime task and stop- ignal performance, thus ruling out 
contributions of inhibitory processes to the priming effect. Experiment 5 showed that 
divergent-thinking primes improved performance in a Attentional-Blink task. Findings 
suggest that convergent thinking induces a control s ate that emphasizes the top-down biasing 
of creative solutions and/or local competition betwen them, whereas divergent thinking is 














Even though creativity is arguably the most important determinant of mankind’s 
intellectual evolution, surprisingly little is known about how creativity actually works 
(Sternberg, Kaufman & Pretz, 2002). One important obstacle on the way to a systematic 
investigation of the mechanics of creativity result from disagreements regarding how to 
define the research question: should one aim to explain how creative products emerge, how 
more creative people differ from less creative ones, or which processes are involved in the 
creative act (see Brown, 1989; Runco, 2007)? These questions are further complicated by 
increasing evidence suggesting that creative acts rely on the interplay of multiple cognitive 
processes and neural networks (e.g., Dietrich, 2004; Eysenck, 1993; Heilman, 2005). To 
tackle some of these problems and avoid others, the present study considered creativity not as 
a trait that a given person may or may not have but, rathe, as a particular type of behavior 
that emerges from a particular state (or a set of states) of the cognitive system that affects the 
way cognitive operations are run. Processes that are not directly involved in information 
processing but that target other processes are commonly thought of as control processes 
(Monsell, 1996), which renders our account a control-state approach to creativity. 
According to Guilford (1950, 1967), the main ingredients of creativity are divergent and 
convergent thinking, even though we do not claim that ese are the only processes involved 
in creative acts. Divergent thinking is taken to represent a style of thinking that allows many 
new ideas being generated, in a context where more than one solution is correct. The 
probably best example is a brainstorming session, which has the aim of generating as many 
ideas on a particular issue as possible. Guilford’s (1967) Alternate Uses Task (AUT) to 
assess the productivity of divergent thinking follows the same scenario: participants are 
presented with a particular object, such as a pen, and they are to generate as many possible 
uses of this object as possible. In contrast, convergent thinking is considered a process of 
generating one possible solution to a particular problem. It emphasizes speed and relies on 
high accuracy and logic. Mednick’s (1962) Remote Associates Task (RAT) that aims to 
assess convergent thinking fits with this profile: participants are presented with three 
unrelated words, such as “time”, “hair”, and “stretch”, and are to identify the common 
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associate (“long”). It makes sense to assume that divergent and convergent thinking are basic 
ingredients of many, if not all truly creative acts, which often comprise of a search for 
possibilities and options followed by the translation of the preferred option into reality 



















Figure 1: Possible mechanisms involved in selecting a goal-rel ted target representation (of a 
perceptual or action event, or a thought) from a set of two competing alternatives. The target A might 
win the competition with an alternative B because: A is selectively supported by the goal 
representation through a facilitatory connection (Route 1: competition bias); A receives other types of 
associative support that suffices to outcompete B (Route 2: local competition); B is directly inhibited 
through some inhibitory control system (Route 3: direct inhibition).  
 
Let us now consider the cognitive control states that would allow or be useful for 
divergent and convergent thinking. According to Colzato et al. (2008), the selection of 
stimulus or response representations (or thoughts, as in our case) can be controlled or biased 
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in at least two different ways. Figure 1 sketches the situation where a decision needs to be 
made between alternative A (the “correct” or most appropriate alternative) and the competing 
alternative B. The competition between the two alternatives is represented by mutually 
inhibitory connections between their representations (Route 2), which captures the 
assumption that decision-making in biological systems is competitive (Bogacz, 2007). 
Competition is likely to yield winners and losers, so that it can be considered as a control 
mechanism that eventually will favor one alternative over others. Another, not necessarily 
exclusive way to facilitate the selection of the appropriate alternative is indicated in the 
figure as Route 1: The preferred alternative might receive top-down support from the 
representation of the action goal. This control strategy is underlying the biased-competition 
approach of Duncan, Humphreys, and Ward (1997), the conflict-resolution model of Cohen 
and colleagues (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter & Cohen, 2001; Cohen, Dunbar & 
McClelland, 1990), the task-switching model of Gilbert and Shallice (2002), and many other 
control models.  
As we assume that control states are affecting the way control is exerted, there are two 
major ways to modulate the processes captured in Figure 1. First, a control state might 
modulate the strength of top-down bias (Route 1) and, thus, increase or decrease the degree 
to which the goal representation supports one alterna ive in its competition with others. 
Second, a control state might modulate the strength of mutual local inhibition between 
alternatives (Route 2) and, thus, the degree to which competitors “suffer” from the support 
and selection of another alternative.2 
Convergent thinking would seem to benefit from a strong degree of goal-directedness that 
is steering and efficiently constraining the search for the right concept or idea. This implies 
reliance on Route 1 and, hence, on a strong top-down bias of decision-making. Duncan, 
Emslie, Williams, Johnson, and Freer (1996) have suggested that individuals differ with 
respect to the degree to which they can provide or at least maintain such a top-down bias. In 
particular, they have claimed, and provided evidence that Spearman’s g, a measure of fluid 
                                                
2 Some authors have pleaded for what in Figure 1 is indicated as Route 3: the inhibition of 




intelligence, is positively correlated with performance on a task that requires participants to 
maintain top-down biases over time. This fits with the observation that performance on 
convergent-thinking tasks is positively correlated with fluid intelligence (Akbari Chermahini 
& Hommel, 2010). 
In contrast, divergent thinking would not seem to benefit from strong top-down control 
but, if anything, from rather weak and “allowing” top-down guidance. Moreover, efficient 
divergent thinking would seem to require jumping from one option to another, which 
suggests that the mutual inhibition between alternative thoughts should be weak. This kind of 
control state seems to be consistent with a number of previous assumptions and recent 
findings. For instance, Eysenck (1993) has related the divergent aspect of creativity to 
schizophrenia and suggested that schizophrenic patients and healthy creative individuals 
share a certain lack of constraints and inhibition in their thinking. Indeed, several authors 
since Bleuler (1978) have characterized schizophrenics as showing a kind of “widening of 
the associative horizon” (Eysenck, 1993). Along thesame lines, Ashby, Isen, and Turken 
(1999) have associated higher dopamine levels (as to be found in schizophrenic patients) 
with greater cognitive flexibility and less inhibition between alternative thoughts (cf., Cohen 
& Servan-Schreiber, 1992). In healthy participants, carriers of the DRD2 TAQ IA 
polymorphism (which results in a 30-40% reduction in DA-D2 receptor density—a receptor 
that drives inhibitory processes) were shown to perform significantly better in a divergent-
thinking task (Reuter, Roth, Holve, & Hennig, 2006).  
These considerations suggest that the convergent- and divergent-thinking components of 
human creativity imply two different, to at least some degree opposite cognitive-control 
states that facilitate or even generate the respective thinking style. In particular, convergent 
thinking seems to require either strong top-down cotrol or strong local competition, or both, 
whereas divergent thinking seems to call for weak top-down control and/or weak local 
competition. The aim of the present study was to seek for evidence, if possible, for the 
existence of these two types of control states and for their hypothesized relationship with 
particular thinking styles. Our general rationale was to characterize the hypothetical control 
states by studying the way they are affecting (supporting or interfering with) cognitive 




The rationale underlying our empirical approach was based on the widely shared 
assumption that control states are inert and therefore changing slowly, especially in the 
absence of a pressing need for change. From a theore ical perspective, this is suggested by 
the assumption that control states (or meta-parameters: Doya, 2002) are globally represented 
and affecting the entire cognitive system (Baars, 1988; James, 1890; Monsell, 1996). 
Empirical support for this idea has been provided by Memelink and Hommel (2005, 2006), 
who showed that the attentional relevance of horizontal versus vertical spatial relationships in 
one task affects the relative weighting of horizontal and vertical stimulus and response codes 
in a logically unrelated but temporally overlapping stimulus-response compatibility task. In 
other words, the attentional set in one task automatically affects the attentional set in another. 
A similar observation has been made by Meiran, Hommel, Bibi, and Lev (2002). They had 
participants carry out sequences of “ready” responses (to signal that they were optimally 
prepared) and choice-reaction responses, and consiste tly found positive (rather than the 
expected negative) correlations between the latencies for these two types of responses. This 
suggests that participants’ speed-accuracy settings fluctuate spontaneously during a task and 
they do so sufficiently slowly to impact temporally close responses in the same way. 
If performing a convergent- or divergent-thinking task requires establishing a particular 
control state, and if this state is relatively inert—so the idea underlying our study—it is likely 
to spill over to and thus affect other, logically unrelated but temporally close tasks. If so, the 
characteristics of the control state adopted in the preceding thinking task (the priming task, as 
we will call it) should become visible through the way performance in the following task (the 
probe task) changes as a function of the type of the priming task. If the probe task can be 
expected to require strong top-down control and/or strong local competition—as many 
laboratory tasks do—performance thereon should be bett r if being primed by a convergent-
thinking than a divergent-thinking task. In the first three experiments, we applied this 
reasoning to several tasks that can be assumed to tap different processes in the information-
processing chain from perception to action. A fourth experiment tested whether the priming 
effects obtained in Experiments 1-3 are likely to reflect inhibitory processes. Finally, a fifth 
experiment included a probe task that is likely to benefit more from a weaker form of top-
down control and/or local competition, so that performance thereon was expected to be better 




EXPERIMENT 1 (GLOBAL-LOCAL TASK) 
 
The first experiment considered the global-local task developed by Navon (1977) as a 
probe task. As Navon and others have shown, people can attend different levels of 
hierarchical stimuli, such as large letters made of smaller letters. Attending to the global 
aspect of such stimuli is commonly easier and perhaps more natural, as can be seen in faster 
reaction times and/or more accurate performance in r sponse to global than to local stimulus 
features (the global-precedence effect; Navon, 1977). Nevertheless, people can be 
successfully instructed to attend to the local level as well, suggesting that the hierarchical 
level to which attention is being directed is under cognitive control. Indeed, the cognitive 
control model of Logan and Gordon (2001) foresees a particular control parameter that is 
assumed to regulate the currently attended stimulus level.  
Maintaining a particular control parameter value or state in the face of stimuli that are 
open to multiple interpretations can be assumed to rely on, or at least encourage the adoption 
of a control strategy that relies on strong top-down support of decision-making (Route 1) 
and/or strong local competition (Route 2) to render the alternative interpretations mutually 
exclusive. If so, one would expect that a convergent-thi king task as a prime facilitates, or is 
at least more compatible with the natural mode of operation. In contrast, a divergent-thinking 
task as a prime would be incompatible with this natural mode and should therefore make it 
less efficient. If we assume that the difference in performance between responding to the 
global versus local stimulus level expresses the difficulty to overrule the natural tendency to 
attend to the global level, we would thus expect that this difference is smaller with a 










Nineteen young healthy adults served as subjects for partial fulfillment of course credit. 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants after the nature of the study were 
explained to them. The protocol was approved by the local ethical committee (Leiden 
University, Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciencs). 
Apparatus and stimuli 
The experiment was controlled by a Switch computer a tached to a Philips 17'' monitor. 
Responses were made by pressing the “Z” or “?” of the QWERTY computer keyboard with 
the left and right index finger, respectively. The target stimuli were adopted from Huizinga, 
Dolan, and van der Molen (2006), and consisted of geometric figures (see Figure 2) 
presented in red on a black screen. Larger (global) rectangles/squares consisted of smaller 
(local) rectangles or squares. Global stimuli (i.e., squares or rectangles; 93 x 93 pixels or 93 x 
189 pixels respectively) were composed of many smaller “ ocal” stimuli (i.e., squares or 
rectangles; 21 x 21 pixels or 8 x 46 pixels respectiv ly). The space between the local 
elements of a stimulus was 3 pixels. A global square consisted of 16 small squares or 8 small 
rectangles; a global rectangle consisted of 32 small squares or 16 small rectangles. The 
experiment was composed by 3 practice and 3 experimental blocks. Convergent and 
divergent conditions were created by presenting participants with two paper and pencil 






























Figure 2: Sequence of events in Experiment 1. 
 
Procedure and Design 
Participants served in two 50-min sessions separated by one week. In one session they 
constantly switched between performing the Remote Association Task (based on Mednick, 
1962, and translated into Dutch) for two minutes to induce convergent thinking (the prime 
task) and completing a block of the global-local taskadopted from Huizinga et al. (2006; see 
below) as probe task. In the other session they constantly switched between carrying out the 
Alternative Use Task (Guilford, 1967) for two minutes to induce divergent thinking (the 
prime task) and performing a block of the global-local probe task. Given that the experiment 
was composed by three practice and three experimental blocks, participants were to switch 
between the prime and the probe task six times per session.The order of these two types of 




Remote Association Task (convergent thinking) 
In this task, participants are presented with three unr lated words (such as time, hair, and 
stretch) and are asked to find a common associate (long). Our Dutch version comprised of 30 
items (Cronbach’s alpha = .85; see Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2011), which were to be 
responded to within 10 min. 
 
Alternate Uses Task (divergent thinking) 
In this task, participants were asked to list as many possible uses for six common 
household items (brick, shoe, newspaper, pen, towel, bottle) as they can within 10 min. The 
results can be scored in several ways with flexibility, the number of different categories used, 
being the most consistent and reliable (Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2010).  
 
Global-Local Task 
In this task, participants responded to randomly presented rectangles or squares by 
pressing a left or right response button, respectivly. Three blocks of trials were 
administered, two training blocks in which the instruc ion (global or local) was constant 
across all trials followed by the experimental block in which participants switch between the 
global and the local task—a condition that increases th  global-local effect. In one of the two 
training blocks, participants responded to the local figures and in the other block they 
responded to the global figure. The order of the training blocks was randomized across 
participants and each block consisted of 80 trials. In the third block participants alternated 
between predictable sequences of four “local” and four “global” trials (90 practice trials and 
150 to-be-analyzed experimental trials). A cue indicated to which dimension (global or local) 
the participants should respond. Cues that related to the global (local) dimension consisted of 
a big (small) square, presented at one side of the targ t stimulus, and a big (small) rectangle, 
presented at the other side of the target stimulus. C e and target remained on the screen until 
a response was given or 3500 ms had passed. The time interval between presentation of the 
cue and of the target stimulus was 500 ms and the interval between responses and the next 
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Performance in the two priming tasks was good and comparable to performance in other 
studies (e.g., Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2010). Participants produced about 15 correct 
responses on average in the Remote Association Task (M=14.8 and SD=4.5) and used about 
33 different categories in the Alternate Uses Task (M=33.3 and SD=10.0). 
Mean RTs and proportions of errors from the global-local task were analyzed as a 
function of priming task (convergent vs. divergent thinking), target level (global vs. local), 
congruency between the stimuli on the two levels (congruent vs. incongruent), and task 
switch (i.e., same vs. different target level as in previous trial: task repetition vs. alternation). 
Four-way ANOVAs for dependent measures were run on RTs and error rates.  
RTs revealed three reliable main effects: The effect of switch, F(1,18)=91.56, p<.0001, 
MSE = 1531.26, η2p = 0.84, was due to that repeating the task allowed for faster responding 
than switching between target levels (346 vs. 389 ms); the effect of target level, 
F(1,18)=85.15, p<.0001, MSE = 1533.82, η2p = 0.83, reflected the well-known global-
precedence effect (Navon, 1977), that is, faster responses to globally than locally defined 
targets (347 vs. 388 ms); and the congruency effect, F(1,18)=36.66, p<.0001, MSE = 
1301.12, η2p = 0.67, indicated interference from the non-target level, that is, faster responses 
if the stimulus at the currently irrelevant level was congruent with the present target than if 
that stimulus was incongruent (355 vs. 380 ms).  
More important for present purposes, priming task interacted with target level, 
F(1,18)=7.54, p<.05, MSE = 1301.12, η2p = 0.30. As suggested by Figure 3, the effect of 
target level was reliable for both convergent and divergent conditions, F(1,18)=42.58, 
p<.0001, MSE = 962.00, η2p = 0.70, and F(1,18)=72.18, p<.0001, MSE = 1320.33, η2p = 
0.80, respectively, but, as predicted, the global preference effect was reduced in the context 




The error rates revealed no interactions but three main effects only: switch, F(1,18)=9.00, 
p<.01, MSE = 54.19, η2p = 0.33, indicating that repeating the task produce  less errors than 
switching between target levels (8.5% vs. 11.1%); target level, F(1,18)=25.30, p<.0001, 
MSE = 89.32, η2p = 0.53, showing more errors to globally than localy defined targets 
(12.58% vs. 7.13%); and congruency, F(1,18)=70.73, p<.0001, MSE = 104.83, η2p = 0.79, 
reflecting the interference of the irrelevant target level, as indicated by a smaller proportion 









































Figure 3: Mean reaction times and error percentages in Experiment 1, as a function of reported 






We expected that the cognitive-control state required for convergent thinking would be 
more consistent with maintaining a less dominant attentional set than the state required for 
divergent thinking. If so, one would expect that the global precedence effect (i.e., the 
performance benefit associated with responses to global as compared to local stimulus 
features) is less pronounced after having performed a convergent-thinking task than after a 
divergent-thinking task. This is exactly what the findings show. As one would expect, 
performance on the easier and more natural global task is unaffected by the priming task, 
whereas the more challenging local task, which is more likely to draw and depend on control 
processes, yields better performance if being primed by the convergent-thinking than by the 
divergent-thinking task.  
A somewhat unexpected outcome is the inverted global-precedence effect in the error 
rates, suggesting better performance in the local task. Importantly, however, this is a mere 
main effect that cannot account for the crucial interaction observed in the RTs.  
 
EXPERIMENT 2 (STROOP TASK) 
 
Even though the global-local task draws on cognitive control, it is a task that taps into 
rather “early” attentional operations on (the outcomes of) perceptual organization processes. 
Our next step was to see whether interactions between creativity tasks and cognitive control 
can also be found for attentional control processes operating on somewhat more abstract 
stimulus representations. A perhaps obvious choice in this context is the Stroop task, which 
requires participants to respond to the color of colored color words—the less familiar and 
less overlearned response. Since the seminal study of Stroop (1935) it is known that people 
perform better in this task if they are presented with congruent stimuli, such as the word 
BLUE in blue ink, than with incongruent stimuli, such as the word GREEN in blue ink (for 
an overview, see MacLeod, 1991).  
Researchers and available models agree that the Stroop effect is due to some sort of 
conflict between color- and word-related codes, which calls upon cognitive control to solve it 
(Cohen et al., 1990). Indeed, given that the stimulus affords different and conflicting types of 
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responding, people need to rely on the representatio  nd top-down impact of the instructed 
action goal to name the color of the stimuli. However, researchers and models do not agree 
on which kinds of codes are involved in, and responible for the conflict: suggestions range 
from perceptual (e.g., Kornblum, 1994) and semantic codes (Seymour, 1977) to response 
representations (Dyer, 1973), often driven by the unrealistic assumption that phenomena as 
complex as the Stroop effect must have no more than one functional locus. To make sure that 
we are tapping conflict between codes that are fairly abstract, we therefore employed a 
semantic version of the Stroop task that was developed by Klein (1964).  
As Klein demonstrated, color-naming responses are not o ly delayed if they refer to the 
ink of incongruent color words but also if they refer to color associates, such as the words 
“frog” (associated with green), “sun” (associated with yellow), or “fire” (associated with 
red). Even though this version has the disadvantage of producing a smaller congruency effect 
than the standard Stroop task, it rules out the possibility that the conflict takes place between 
perceptual codes—as was the case in Experiment 1. Hence, Experiment 2 was likely to target 
a different control domain than Experiment 1 did. Nevertheless, our predictions were similar. 
If successful performance in the Stroop task requires strong top-down guidance from the task 
goal, this control state should be more compatible with the control state established in a 
convergent-thinking task If so, the Stroop effect (i.e., the difference between performance on 
congruent and incongruent Stroop stimuli) should be smaller for convergent-thinking primes 




Twenty new young healthy adults served as subjects for partial fulfillment of course 
credit. They satisfied the same criteria as in Experim nt 1. Convergent- and divergent-
thinking prime conditions were created as in Experim nt 1, the procedure was analogous 
(except that the global-local task was replaced by the Stroop task), and the apparatus was 
identical. 
In the Stroop task, participants responded to yellow, blue, green, and red words by 
pressing the “Z”, “X”, “>” or “?” buttons of the QWERTY computer keyboard, respectively. 
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Eight Dutch color-associates served as (irrelevant) word stimuli: “boom” (tree), “zee” (sea), 
“zon” (sun), “citroen” (lemon), “gras” (grass), “lucht” (sky), “bloed” (blood), and “vuur” 
(fire), presented on the black background of the computer screen. The words appeared in 
either their semantically implied color (50% congruent trials; e.g., the word bloed in red ink) 
or in a semantically unrelated color (50% incongruent trials; e.g., the word bloed in green 
ink). The Stroop task took about 10 min, in which participants were asked to respond to the 
color of the 144 randomly presented color words while ignoring word meanings. The target 
remained on the screen until a response was given. During inter stimulus intervals a white 
fixation cross stayed on the black screen. The interval between presentation of the cue and of 
the target stimulus was 500 ms. The Stroop task was composed of two experimental blocks, 
so that participants were to switch between the prime and the probe task two times per 
session. 
Results and Discussion 
 
Performance in the Remote Association Task (M=7.4 and SD=3.5) and the Alternate 
Uses Task (M=13.2 and SD=4.2) was good; the lower absolute scores as compared to 
Experiment 1 reflected the fact that participants had only 2 instead of 6 2-minute intervals to 
complete the creativity tasks. Mean RTs and proportions of errors from the Stroop task were 
analyzed as a function of priming task (convergent vs. divergent thinking) and congruency 
(congruent vs. incongruent). Two-way ANOVAs were run on RTs and error rates. RTs 
revealed a reliable main effect for congruency, F(1,19)=13.23, p<0.01, MSE = 3923.5, η2p = 
0.41, that is, faster responses to congruent (588 ms) than incongruent stimuli (602 ms). 
Importantly, this Stroop-like effect was modified by priming task, F(1,19)= 4.48, p<0.05, 
MSE = 1206.6, η2p = 0.19. As suggested by Figure 4, congruency was reliable for both 
convergent and divergent conditions but, as predict, this Stroop-like effect was smaller for 
the convergent-thinking than for the divergent-thinking prime. The analysis of the error rates 
revealed no significant effect. This outcome supports ur assumption that the control state 
implemented in the convergent-thinking task was more compatible with the control state that 
is functional for performing the Stroop task than the control state implemented in the 












































Figure 4: Mean reaction times and error percentages in Experiment 2, as a function of the 
relationship between named color and the meaning of the stimulus word (congruent vs. incongruent) 
and priming task (convergent vs. divergent thinking).  
 
EXPERIMENT 3 (SIMON TASK) 
 
The outcome of Experiment 2 suggests that the control-state-compatibility effect 
observed in a perceptual-conflict task in Experiment 1 generalizes to tasks that are likely to 
involve semantic conflicts. In Experiment 3 we went o  by testing whether the same pattern 
of results can also be demonstrated in a task that taps into response conflict. The arguably 
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purest assessment of response conflict is represented by the Simon task (cf., Hommel, 2011). 
In this task, participants respond to a non-spatial fe ture of commonly visual stimuli by 
pressing left and right response buttons. Importantly, the location of the stimulus varies 
randomly and is thus sometimes corresponding with the location of the correct response (the 
compatible condition) and sometimes not (the incompatible condition). As one might expect, 
performance is better with compatible than with incompatible relationships between stimulus 
location and response—the Simon effect (Simon & Small, 1969). Given that this task does 
not include any congruency or incongruency between th  stimulus features (i.e., the non-
spatial feature, such as color, and the spatial locati n), the Simon effect can be taken as a 
pure measure of response conflict (Hommel, 2011; Kornblum, Hasbroucq & Osman, 1990). 
Even though the type of conflict is likely to be different from the effects studied in 
Experiments 1 and 2, it makes sense to assume that the successfully performing the Simon 
task relies on a similar type of top-down support of the relevant stimulus feature as we have 
assumed for the global-local task and the Stroop task. Accordingly, we expected that the 
Simon effect would be smaller if being primed by a convergent-thinking task. 
 
Method 
Nineteen new young healthy adults served as subjects for partial fulfillment of course 
credit. The method was as in Experiment 1 except that the global-local task was replaced by 
the Simon task. 
In the Simon task, a small (.5 x .5 cm) dark-grey fixation square stayed at the center of 
the screen. The target stimulus was either a green or a blue circle (1.5 cm in diameter) that 
appeared left or right of fixation. Circle color and location varied randomly but equiprobably. 
Responses were made by pressing the “Z” or “?” buttons on the computer keyboard with the 
left or right index finger, respectively. 
Participants made speeded discriminative responses to the color of the circle, which 
stayed on screen until a response was given or 1500 ms had passed. Intervals between 
subsequent stimuli varied randomly but equiprobably, from 1750-2250 ms in steps of 100 
ms. Participants were asked to ignore the location of the stimulus and to react as fast as 
possible while keeping error rates below 15% on average; feedback was provided at the end 
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of a trial block. The task consisted of 60 practice rials (practice block) and 300 experimental 
trials (5 experimental blocks), and took about 25 min. to complete. Participants were thus to 
switch between the prime and the probe task six times per session.   
 
Results and Discussion 
Participants showed good performance in the Remote Association Task (M=7.7 and SD= 
2.9) and the Alternate Uses Task (M=33 and SD=7.04). Mean RTs and proportions of errors 
from the Simon task were analyzed as a function of priming task (convergent vs. divergent 
thinking) and compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible). There was reliable main effect of 
compatibility in RTs, F(1,18)=227.95, p<0.001, MSE = 23207.49, η2p = 0.42, showing faster 
responses in compatible than incompatible conditions (346 vs. 381 ms). Importantly, 
compatibility interacted with priming task, F(1, 18)= 8.14, p=0.011, MSE = 145.84, η2p = 
0.31. While the compatibility was reliable for both types of priming, the Simon effect was 
reduced by the convergent-thinking prime (see Figure 5). The analysis of the error rates 
revealed no significant effect. We can thus conclude that the control-state-compatibility 
effect obtained in Experiments 1 and 2 generalizes to a task tapping into response conflict.  
 
EXPERIMENT 4 (STOP-SIGNAL TASK) 
 
The results from Experiments 1-3 suggest that the control states that creativity tasks 
induce exert specific effects on logically unrelated laboratory tasks in which perceptual, 
semantic, or response conflicts are to be resolved. According to our theoretical reasoning, 
these conflicts reflect competition between the cognitive representations of stimulus events 
and/or actions, which needs to be resolved by biasing the interaction in such a way that goal-
compatible representations are strengthened and therefor  winning the competition. The role 
of a suitable control state in this scenario would be to provide a configuration of the cognitive 
system that maximizes this bias, be it through strengthening the competition bias or local 














































Figure 5: Mean reaction times and error percentages in Experiment 3, as a function of the 
relationship between stimulus location and response location (compatible vs. incompatible) and 
priming task (convergent vs. divergent thinking).  
 
 
An alternative scenario is possible however. Various a thors since Freud (1896) have 
emphasized the importance of inhibitory processes in regulating intentional behavior. In 
particular, researchers have considered the direct inhibition of response representations as a 
possible alternative or addition to competition biases (e.g., Harnishfeger, 1995; Ridderinkhof, 
2002)—as indicated as Route 3 in Figure 1. With rega d to the present Experiments 1-3, one 
might therefore argue that good performance in the global-local task, the Stroop task, and the 
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Simon task did not benefit from the convergent-thinking prime task because it had induced 
stronger competition bias or local competition but, ra her, because it had strengthened some 
sort of inhibitory control. More inhibition might have selectively operated on and weakened 
global representations in the local task, word representations in the Stroop task, and location 
representations in the Simon task. It is often difficult to rule out such a possibility because 
direct inhibition on the one hand and the interplay between competition bias and local 
competition on the other can mimic each other's effects (Colzato et al., 2008): many effects 
related to the control of inter-representational conflict can be alternatively modeled by either 
increasing the impact of Route 3 or by increasing the strength of both Route 1 and Route 2.  
In Experiment 4 we tackled this problem by using a probe task that is arguably the most 
reliable tool to tap into inhibitory control: the stop-signal task developed by Logan and 
Cowan (1984). In this task, participants are first prompted to execute a response but then, 
briefly before this response is executed, presented with a stop signal calling for the 
immediate abortion of that response. Systematically v r ing the time interval between the go 
signal and the following stop signal allows one to calculate the so-called stop-signal reaction 
time (SSRT), which represents an estimation of the processing time needed to stop execution 
just in time. Several observations have validated the assumption that this task taps into 
inhibitory control. For instance, SSRTs are elevated in various groups that are known to have 
difficulties inhibiting motor activity and/or unwanted actions, such as patients suffering from 
Parkinson’s disease (Gauggel, Rieger & Feghoff, 2004) or diagnosed with ADHD (for a 
recent review see, Alderson, Rapport & Kofler, 2007), and cocaine users (Colzato, van den 
Wildenberg & Hommel, 2007). If the task-priming effects obtained in Experiments 1-3 
would reflect inhibitory-control processes, we should find comparable priming effects on 
SSRT in the stop signal task. In particular, SSRTs should be faster (i.e., inhibition more 
efficient) if being primed by a convergent-thinking task than by a divergent-thinking task. In 
contrast, no such effect would be expected if the previous priming effects were due to the 






Twenty new young healthy adults served as subjects for partial fulfillment of course 
credit. The method was as in Experiment 1 except that the global-local task was replaced by 
the stop-signal task.In the stop-signal task (adopted from Colzato et al., 2007), responses 
were made by pressing the “Z” or “?” of the QWERTY computer keyboard with the left and 
right index finger, respectively. Participants were to react quickly and accurately by pressing 
the left and right key in response to the direction of a pseudo-randomly left- or right-pointing 
green arrow (go trials) of about 3.5 X 2.0 cm. Arrows appeared for 1500 ms or until a 
response was given. Intervals between subsequent go si nals varied randomly but 
equiprobably, from 1250 to 1750 ms in steps of 125 ms. During these interstimulus intervals, 
a white fixation point (3 mm in diameter) stayed on the screen. The green arrow changed to 
red on 30 % of the trials, upon which the choice response had to be aborted (stop trials). A 
staircase-tracking procedure dynamically adjusted the delay between the onset of the go 
signal and the onset of the stop signal to control inhibition probability (Levitt, 1971). After a 
successfully inhibited stop trial, the next stop-signal delay increased by 50 ms, whereas the 
delay decreased by 50 ms after the participant was un ble to stop. This algorithm ensured 
that motor actions were successfully inhibited in about half of the stop trials, which yielded 
accurate estimates of SSRT and compensates for differences in choice RT between 
participants (Band, van der Molen &Logan, 2003). The task consisted of five blocks of 104 
trials each, the first of which served as a practice block to obtain stable performance, and it 
took about 30 min. to complete. Participants thus were to switch between the prime and the 
probe task five times per session. 
Results and Discussion 
 
Participants showed good performance in the Remote Association Task (M=11.8 and 
SD=2.7) and the Alternate Uses Task (M=23.8 and SD=6.2). T-tests of mean RTs to go-
signals indicated almost identical levels of performance in convergent and divergent sessions 
(389 vs. 386 ms, respectively), p>.66. More importantly, the same was true for SSRTs (205 
vs. 207 ms), p>77. 
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The outcome does not provide any support for the assumption that inhibitory processes 
were responsible for the beneficial impact of contrl states related to convergent thinking on 
performance in the global-local task, the Stroop task, nd the Simon task—at least as far as 
these processes are captured by the stop-signal task. Even though this conclusion is based on 
a null effect and needs thus be treated with the necessary caution, it is consistent with the 
assumption that the task-priming effects observed in the present Experiments 1-3 reflect 
commonalities between prime and probe tasks in terms of Route-1 and/or Route-2 
mechanisms but not Route-3 mechanisms. 
 
EXPERIMEINT 5 (ATTENTIONAL BLINK) 
 
Experiments 1-3 provided evidence that creativity tasks and, as we assume, the control 
states they require have a systematic impact on subseq ent conflict tasks. However, all three 
demonstrations of such priming effects followed the same pattern in showing better 
performance after a convergent-thinking task. On the one hand, this makes sense given that 
most laboratory tasks targeting cognitive control pcesses were designed to study the impact 
of goals and intentions on cognitive processing under pressure, that is, under conditions that 
are challenging the maintenance of goals and intentions or their translation into overt 
behavior. Accordingly, it is not surprising that performance in these tasks benefits from 
control states that, as we argue in the case of convergent thinking, make the top-down biasing 
of cognitive processing and/or the exclusiveness of decision-making more efficient.  
On the other hand, however, the observation that convergent thinking turned out to be the 
better prime in all the conflict tasks we investigaed raises the possibility that other, less 
specific factors might have played a role. Fortunately, Experiment 4 provided evidence that 
the convergent-thinking task does not improve performance in every possible task or 
measure, which rules out general factors like motivation, task difficulty, and effort 
consumption. The same conclusion is suggested by the observation that the priming task 
failed to produce a main effect on performance in any of the other probe tasks as well. 
However, it is possible that conflict-related measure , such as the global-local effect, the 
Stroop and the Simon effect, are more sensitive than is the general performance level, so that 
it is difficult to rule out that the positive impact of convergent thinking on subsequent 
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performance is less specific than we suggest. This suggestion would gain credibility it the 
opposite pattern could also be demonstrated, that is, if it could be shown that task 
performance can also benefit from divergent thinking i  principle. Experiment 5 was 
designed to provide such a demonstration, if possible. 
As we have alluded to already, most tasks that are assumed to tap into cognitive control 
processes follow the strategy suggested by Ach (1905)—presumably the first to investigate 
the human will experimentally—to put the task goal in opposition to one’s habits, such as the 
tendency to respond to the global shape or locations of visual objects, or to read words rather 
than naming their color. Only if our will to execute he task goal can overcome these 
opposing habits, so the idea, can we be sure that performance measures are actually reflecting 
the operation of the will—or of cognitive control, as we now call it. Accordingly, the degree 
to which opposing habits can be overcome provides a direct measure of willpower (Ach, 
1910) or, in more modern terms, of the efficiency of cognitive control. From this perspective, 
any increase of top-down control would be expected to improve performance, which makes 
many laboratory tasks less promising candidates for demonstrating a beneficial priming 
effect of divergent thinking. And yet, there is one widely used task that has been suspected to 
suffer from too much cognitive control: the Attentional Blink (AB) task (Raymond, Shapiro 
& Arnell, 1992).  
The AB is observed if two difficult to identify target stimuli appear in close temporal 
proximity, such as in tasks using rapid serial visual presentation techniques. Whereas the first 
target (T1) is commonly easy to report accurately, performance on the second target (T2) is 
often dramatically impaired if it follows T1 within 200-500 ms. Most researchers agree that 
the AB reflects some sort of attentional bottleneck that prevents the consolidation of T2 
while T1 is being processed, so that T2 is registered but forgotten before it can be reported 
(cf. Hommel et al., 2006; Martens & Wyble, 2010).  
The nature of the underlying bottleneck is less well understood, however. There is 
increasing evidence that the presence and size of the AB depends on the task context (e.g., Di 
Lollo, Kawahara, Ghorashi & Enns, 2005) and the instructions participants are receiving. For 
instance, the size of the AB is considerably reduce, and the effect sometimes disappears 
altogether, if participants are encouraged to assume a ore relaxed attitude towards the task 
(Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2005) or are otherwise distrac ed (Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2006). 
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According to Olivers and Nieuwenhuis (2006), this pattern suggests that the AB is due to an 
overinvestment of attentional resources into the processing and consolidation of T1, which 
leaves too little for T2 to perform accurately. This possibility fits well with findings of 
Shapiro, Schmitz, Martens, Hommel, and Schnitzler (2006), who studied electromagnetic 
markers of attentional resource allocation in the AB task. As it turned out, participants who 
showed more evidence of attention-related brain activity while processing T1 were more 
likely to miss T2 in the blink interval. In other words, people are showing a smaller AB the 
less they monopolize attentional resources for T1 processing. 
Considering the characteristics that we hypothesize to underlie convergent and divergent 
thinking, it makes sense to assume that the control s ate driving divergent thinking might be 
more beneficial for good performance in the AB task than the control state implied by 
convergent thinking. If divergent thinking weakens the impact of top-down control on the 
activation of target representations and/or the local competition between them, this would 
seem to be a good strategy for reducing the size of the AB. Two recent observations support 
this idea. For one, bilinguals have been shown to produce a larger AB than monolinguals 
(Colzato et al., 2008). Learning and mastering a second language is often assumed to 
increase cognitive conflict because it inflates thepossibilities to express almost any given 
concept. To deal with this challenge, bilinguals have been claimed to develop special control 
strategies to better focus on words from one language to the expense of words from the other 
(Green, 1998), and there is evidence that these strategies generalize to non-lingual conflict 
tasks (for an overview, see Bialystok & Craik, 2010). If we thus assume that bilinguals exert 
more top-down control (i.e., have developed a stronger Route-1 mechanism), the finding that 
they produce a more pronounced AB suggests that convergent thinking may indeed be 
associated with a less AB-suitable control state than divergent thinking is.  
For another, Calvinists have been shown to produce a larger AB than atheists (Colzato, 
Hommel & Shapiro, 2010). Following Colzato, Hommel, and colleagues (Colzato, van Beest 
et al., 2010; Hommel & Colzato, 2010), Calvinists are trained to focus on individual goals 
and to adopt a particularly “exclusive” control profile, which translates into an emphasis of 
Route-1 and Route-2 mechanisms. As this emphasis is apparently associated with a larger 
AB, it makes sense to assume that a divergent-thinking priming task leads to a smaller AB 




Twenty new young healthy adults served as subjects for partial fulfillment of course 
credit. The method was as in Experiment 1 except that the global-local task was replaced by 
the AB task. 
The AB task was adopted from Colzato, Hommel, and Shapiro (2010). Participants were 
seated at a viewing distance of about 50 cm. The fixation mark (“+”) and all target (digit) and 
distractor (letter) stimuli (16-point Times New Roman font) were presented centrally in black 
on a gray background. Letters were drawn randomly without replacement from the complete 
alphabet. Digits were drawn randomly from the set 1-9.   
Participants were to identify and report two digits (T1 and T2) presented in a rapid stream 
of letter distractors. After having read the instruc ions, which included a slow demonstration 
of the RSVP, and indicating to have fully understood the task, participants went through 24 
training trials, which we re-run if participants made more than 50% errors. The fixation mark 
was shown for 2000 ms and, after a blank interval of n ther 250 ms, the presentation of the 
letter-digit stream commenced. Twenty 20 items appered with a duration of 70 ms each and 
an inter-stimulus interval of 30 ms.  
The position of T1 in the stimulus stream varied randomly between positions 7, 8, and 9, 
so to reduce predictability. T2 was presented directly after T1 (lag 1), or after another 2, 4, or 
7 distracters (lag 3, 5, and 8 respectively). Both targets were to be reported directly (order of 
report was not considered) after the last item of the stream was presented by pressing the 
corresponding digit keys. The task was composed by three blocks (144 experimental trials: 3 
temporal locations of T1 x 4 lags x 12 repetitions) and took about 15 min. to complete. 
Participants werethus to switch between the prime and the probe task three times per session. 
 
Results 
Participants showed good performance in the Remote Association Task (M=8.8 and 
SD=2.8) and the Alternate Uses Task (M=18.4 and SD=4.6). T1 and conditional T2 (T2|T1) 
accuracy data were submitted to separate ANOVAs with lag (1, 3, 5, and 8) as a within-
participants factor and prime task as between-participant factor. The T1 analysis produced a 
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main effect of lag, F(3,57)=35.57, p<0.001, MSE = .001, η2p = 0.65, due to a dip of 
performance with the shortest lag (accuracy: 89.2%, 96.5%, 95.8%, and 95.0%, for lags 1, 3, 
5, and 8, respectively). This pattern is typical for AB tasks in which presentation rate is fast 
and the two targets belong to the same category and, thus, satisfy the same selection criteria 
(Colzato, Hommel & Shapiro, 2010; Hommel & Akyürek, 2005; Potter, Staub & O'Connor, 
2002).  
Lag






























Figure 6: Report accuracy in Experiment 5 for T1 (unconditional) and T2 (given T1correct), as a 
function of the priming task (convergent vs. divergent thinking).  
 
More importantly, the analysis of conditional T2 accuracy rendered all three effects 
significant: the main effects of lag, F(3,57)=173.88, p<0.001, MSE = .004, η2p = 0.90, and 
prime task, F(1,19)=5.51, p<0.03, MSE = .02, η2p = 0.22, and the interaction, F(3,57)=5.42, 
p<0.002, MSE = .006, η2p = 0.22. The underlying pattern is shown in Figure 6: Whereas the 
two prime tasks yielded comparable performance at the shortest and longest lag,F < 1, a 
divergent-thinking prime produced better performance than the convergent-thinking prime at 
lag 3, F(1,19)=9.30, p<0.01, MSE = .015, η2p = 0.33, and tended to do so at lag 5, 
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F(1,19)=3.95, p=0.062, MSE = .017, η2p = 0.17. In other words, divergent thinking reduced 
the AB. 
The outcome of Experiment 5 was as expected, which suggests that the cognitive control 
states induced by convergent thinking are beneficial for many but apparently not for all 
cognitive tasks. Even though it seems clear that some degree of top-down processing must 
take place in performing an AB task (so to keep the target templates sufficiently active to 
detect a matching target), this task is likely to suffer from overinvestment of attentional 
resources (Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2006; Shapiro et al., 2006). Our observations confirm 
that such overinvestment is counteracted to some degree at least by the cognitive set people 
establish when engaging in brainstorming-like activities. This fits nicely with the previous 
observations that the AB is reduced if participants as ume a more relaxed attitude towards 




The aim of the present study was to characterize the cognitive-control states that 
participants establish when carrying out a creativity task by seeking for after-effects of 
divergent-thinking and convergent-thinking tasks on common, reasonably well understood 
cognitive tasks. A systematic pattern emerged: convergent thinking benefited performance in 
the global-local task (Experiment 1), the semantic-S roop task (Experiment 2), and the Simon 
task (Experiment 3) more than divergent thinking did. These tasks are suspected to induce 
conflict between perceptual interpretations, semantic representation, and response codes, 
respectively, which suggests that the cognitive-control state underlying convergent thinking 
is well-suited to reduce various sorts of cognitive conflict. As we have suggested, this might 
be because this control state is characterized by a relatively strong top-down support of task-
relevant information and/or by relatively strong local competition between representations of 
relevant and irrelevant information (Routes 1 and 2). In contrast, the two prime tasks had no 
specific impact on the ability of participants to inh bit strong response tendencies 
(Experiment 4). This is inconsistent with any role of inhibitory processes in regulating 
convergent and divergent thinking (Route 3), at least as far as they are needed for and 
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assessed by the stop-signal task. Finally, we were able to show that the control state induced 
by convergent thinking is not advantageous for all cognitive tasks. In particular, tasks that 
can be assumed to benefit from a relaxation of top-d wn control, such as the AB task, gain 
more from the control state induced by divergent thinking (Experiment 5). 
Taken together, our findings suggest a relatively clear-cut picture, according to which 
convergent and divergent thinking are associated with specific control states that people can 
apparently establish on-the-fly. On the one hand, this does not rule out the possibility that 
some individuals are more able, proficient, or practiced in establishing one or another of 
these states. In that sense, our findings do not rule o t the possibility that some individuals 
are, or at least can be more creative than others—the trait account of creativity. On the other 
hand, however, our findings do suggest that creativity s also a matter of inter-individual 
variability. In other words, the same person can be more or less creative—the state account 
of creativity. 
One important aspect of the pattern we obtained is that human creativity is not a unitary 
concept. Even though creativity studies have been usi g versions of our divergent-thinking 
and convergent-thinking tasks for decades, our findings provide strong evidence that these 
two types of tasks do not measure the same thing. This also fits with Akbari Chermahini and 
Hommel’s (2010) observation that both types of tasks are related to dopamine but in very 
different ways and with the conclusion of Baas, De Dr u, and Nijstad (2008) that creativity 
tasks differ substantially in their sensitivity for particular aspects of creative performance. It 
may very well be that both convergent and divergent thinking is needed for truly creative 
activities: divergent thinking presumably more in the leading brainstorming phase that 
considers all possible options and convergent thinking more in the following phase in which 
the preferred option is further thought through and worked out. Nevertheless, it seems to 
make little sense of speaking about creativity as such without referring to specific cognitive 
or computational functions. Only if these functions can be properly isolated, a realistic 
functional and neural model of creative performance can be developed. 
One limitation of our experimental approach is that it did not provide a neutral baseline, 
so that it is impossible to say whether better performance after one type of thinking was due 
to a benefit associated with this thinking style or interference associated with the other style 
or both. However, this consideration is based on the questionable assumption that a given 
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participant’s control state is neutral before enteri g a psychological laboratory. Note that our 
experimental rationale could only work because control states are apparently inert and tend to 
outlive the task for which they were created (Allport et al., 1994; Memelink & Hommel, 
2006). This implies that every experimental subject brings mixtures of various control states 
to the lab—states that were originally created to master the exam the subject was coming 
from, to overcomethe participant’s tendency to smoke after lunch, to avoid distractions on his 
or her way to the testing room, and so forth. Research on the so-called resting-state activity 
(Smith et al., 2010) provides strong evidence that even having a participant to do nothing at 
all creates very specific types of interactions within and between neural networks—control 
states that is. All we could thus hope for was that our experimental manipulations were 
pushing the control states of our participants in one r another direction without getting even 
near to any perfect experimental control. Even thoug  this does not allow addressing all the 
questions that may remain, it was sufficient to demonstrate that the control states induced by 
the two types of creativity tasks are different and more compatible with some tasks but not 
with others. 
Considering that convergent and divergent thinking apparently induce different control 
states and, thus, are supporting performance in different types of tasks, it might be tempting 
to assume that these control states are opposites, mirror images of each other. In fact, the 
scenarios we developed in the introduction might suggest that the two critical control routes 
(1 and 2) are correlated in such a way that cognitive control may alternatively engage in 
either a strict control style involving strong top-down bias and local competition or in a loose 
control style involving weak top-down guidance and local competition. Even though such an 
approach would certainly be attractive in its parsimony, we at this point hesitate to adopt it 
for at least three reasons implied by the observations of Akbari Chermahini and Hommel 
(2010). One is that individual performance in convergent thinking and divergent thinking 
was not correlated, which does not fit with the negative correlation that the unidimensional 
account would suggest. Second, convergent thinking was more reliably correlated with fluid 
intelligence than divergent thinking was but, if anything, the two correlations tended to go 
into the same direction with better convergent and divergent thinking performance with 
individuals higher in intelligence. Again, a unidimensional account would rather seem to 
suggest correlations of different signs. And, as mentioned already, both convergent and 
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divergent thinking performance was related to a physiological marker of dopamine 
production but the two functions obtained cannot be described as the opposites of each other: 
whereas convergent thinking was linearly related to opamine (better performance the lower 
the dopamine level), divergent thinking related to dopamine in an inverted-U shape (best 
performance with medium levels). Even though it is true that psychological functions might 
be related to neurochemistry in complicated ways, these different profiles do not provide 
support for the idea that the control states underlying convergent and divergent thinking are 
mere mirror images of each other. In any case, more res arch on this issue is urgently 
needed. 
Our study aimed at characterizing the two arguably most relevant and most often 
investigated types of creative activity. However, we do not mean to imply that convergent 
and divergent thinking cover the whole range of human creativity, nor do we think that the 
two types of control states that we focused on are the only aspects of controlling creative 
behavior. For instance, Dietrich (2004) made a distinction between deliberate and 
spontaneous creative processes and between cognitive and emotional knowledge domains 
within which these processes operate. Considering the nature of our tasks, the present study 
could thus be characterized as targeting deliberate creative processes operating in a mainly 
cognitive knowledge domain. Even though Dietrich’s framework is post hoc and has not yet 
been empirically tested, it is thus possible that our conclusions do not, or not fully, generalize 
to spontaneous creativity and/or knowledge with a stronger emotional flavor. 
Another interesting distinction that has been made with respect to creative processes is 
that between solutions that are associated with a conscious “Aha!” or insight experience and 
those that are not (for an overview, see Kounios & Jung-Beeman, in press). Jung-Beeman 
and colleagues have provided evidence that insight-associated solutions are mediated by 
different brain areas and that these areas are differentially sensitive to experimental 
manipulations, such as solution priming (e.g., Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003; Jung-Beeman 
et al., 2004). Given the relatively long-lasting after-effects of creativity tasks in the present 
study, it makes sense to assume that participants in such insight studies do not switch 
between different control configurations on a trial-to-trial basis. This suggests that the same 
control configuration can generate different types of experience and, presumably, allow for 
different ways to find a creative solution. Which way is chosen in a given trial might be the 
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result of competition between alternative solutions a d the differential top-down support they 
receive. Note that providing strong Route-1 support for one alternative only biases, but does 
not determine, the ultimate decision, so that sometimes a non-supported alternative might 
win the competition. If one considers top-down support a kind of expectation, a winning non-
supported alternative might be more surprising and more likely to trigger an “Aha!” 
experience. In any case, it seems clear that future res arch does not only need to differentiate 
between different types of processes underlying creativ  behavior and different types of 
control states driving these processes, but it also needs to study the manner in which control 
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Summary of results 
 
 In this thesis, five empirical chapters investigated he functional and neuromodulatory 
basis of creativity, and tried to identify optimal conditions for divergent and convergent 
thinking. Since there is not a consensus in the scintific community on the definition of 
creativity, it is important to define the processes under study and the kind of task or test being 
applied to measure the concept of interest. In this the is, two different thinking styles were 
considered as two different types of creativity: divergent and convergent thinking. The 
Alternative Uses Task (AUT) (Guilford, 1967) was employed to measure divergent thinking, 
and the Remote Associate Task (RAT) (Mednick, 1962) to measure convergent thinking.  
Participants in this research were native Dutch speakers, so Dutch versions of creativity 
tests were needed. The AUT was easy to adapt and partici nts could easily be asked to write 
down as many possible uses for a common house hold item in their own language. However 
the RAT is different and its nature necessitated the development and validation of a Dutch 
version.  In chapter 2, we have reported the development and validation of a 30-item Dutch 
version of the RAT, and Item Response Theory (IRT) was applied to generate a short, 
qualified, and valid 22-item out of 30-item test. The 30-item test was used in this thesis. The 
22-item is reliable and very useful test to measure convergent thinking in research with time 
restrictions. The IRT approach was used to identify d ficulty and discrimination parameters 
for each item as well, so one can choose items that fit the sample (for example: a group of 
people with low or high ability) and purpose of theresearch.  
In chapter 3 we addressed whether individual measurs of creativity would co-vary with 
the individual eye-blink rate (EBR), which may point to a connection between creativity and 
dopamine. The relationship between creativity, intellig nce, and EBR—a clinical marker of 
brain dopamine function—was investigated. Results of three experiments with separate 
groups of subjects revealed that performance on an i telligence test (fluid intelligence) does 
not depend on brain dopamine function while creativ performance does: results showed a 
negative correlation between convergent thinking and dopamine level and performance on 




The results of the experiments reported in chapter 3 were considered as the basic idea to 
run a mood induction experiment, which is reported in chapter 4. Results of a (positive or 
negative) mood induction experiment show that positive mood, when compared to negative 
mood, increased EBR and enhanced creative performance on a divergent thinking test. These 
results are consistent with previous research showing that positive mood enhances creative 
performance (Isen et al., 1987) and with the idea that he influence of positive mood on 
cognitive performance is due to increased dopamine lev ls (Ashby et at., 1999). Positive 
mood significantly increases EBR and improved flexibility in a divergent thinking task in 
people with low dopamine level. But there is a different scenario for people with medium (or 
high) level of dopamine, as the benefit of positive mood was very small and not significant. 
We conclude that the impact of positive mood on the performance in divergent thinking 
depends on an individual’s dopamine level.  
Chapter 5 presents the results of an experiment that investigated influence of performing 
a creativity test (divergent vs. convergent thinking) on mood state. Results revealed that 
performing divergent and convergent thinking tasks improved and impaired current mood, 
respectively. These results support the idea that mood and cognition are not just related, but 
that this relation is fully reciprocal (Bar, 2009; Gray, 2004; Gross, 2002; Salovey et al., 
2002). 
Performing divergent and convergent thinking tests tablishes different cognitive control 
states. This idea was investigated in chapter 6 by seeking for after-effects of performing two 
creativity tests on five well-known cognitive tasks (1-Global-Local, 2-Stroop, 3-Simon, 4-
Stop-Signal, 5-Attentional Blink). Results show that the control state induced by convergent 
thinking benefited performance in cognitive tasks that require top-down control and strong 
local competition between representations of relevant and irrelevant information (tasks 1-3); 
in contrast, divergent thinking induced a cognitive control state that enhances performance 









Brain dopamine function and performance on divergent and convergent thinking tasks 
The studies of this thesis provide empirical evidence that creativity is not a homogeneous 
concept; rather it reflects the interplay of separate, dissociable processes such as convergent 
and divergent thinking (e.g., Guilford, 1967). The cognitive mechanism of these two 
processes is different, but not opposite as assumed by Eysenck (1993). Taken together, 
results of four studies presented in this thesis (chapters 3-6) show that convergent and 
divergent thinking are not necessarily opposite but they are not the same either, and optimal 
performance in different types of creativity tasks requires different conditions.  
In chapter 3 we concluded that performance on divergent-thinking tasks varies as a 
function of individual dopamine level, where medium levels produce the best performance, 
while convergent thinking was best with low dopamine levels. This suggests that divergent 
and convergent thinking are both related to dopamine, but to different degrees and in 
different ways. It was observed that eye-blink rate was predicting creative performance, 
which provides strong support for approaches that rel e creativity to dopamine (Ashby et al., 
1999; Eysenck, 1993; Reuter et al., 2006). At the same time, however, the obtained 
dissociation calls for a more differentiated approach that distinguishes between convergent 
and divergent processes and allows for tapping different creativity-dopamine functions. 
If positive mood increases the dopamine level, which also works as a mechanism to 
improve performance, as suggested by Ashby et al. (1999), then it seems difficult to account 
for the impact of mood-enhancing manipulations on performance. As we report in chapter 4,  
participants with a relatively low level of dopaminergic functioning are likely to benefit from 
better mood, whereas people with a relatively high level of dopaminergic functioning, such 
as individuals scoring high in psychoticism (Colzato, Slagter, van den Wildenberg & 
Hommel, 2009), may actually do not benefit of better mood. Depending on which part of the 
distribution happens to be more strongly represented in a given sample, the corresponding 
study may find a positive, negative, or no relationship between mood and the given 
performance measure. This may explain the seemingly confusing and contradictory 
relationship between mood and performance (Baas, De Dreu & Nijstad, 2008; Davis, 2009), 
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especially if one considers that divergent and convergent thinking, often treated equivalent 
indicators of creativity, seem to relate to dopaminergic functioning in different ways. In fact, 
this thesis’ observations (negative correlation betwe n eye blink rate and performance in 
convergent thinking, chapter 3) suggest that increasing dopaminergic supply can be expected 
to actually hamper convergent thinking irrespective of the current level. If so, then mood is 
unlikely to affect convergent and divergent thinking  the same fashion, which is yet another 
reason as to make a distinction between the different aspects of human creativity. 
 
Optimal brain dopamine function for cognition and creativity 
Evidence from both physiological and behavioral studies suggests that normal cognitive 
performance occurs only within a limited range of dpamine receptor activation. Researchers 
have shown that cognitive functions are impaired when there is a decrease in dopamine 
functioning in the brain, as in Parkinson’s disease, or with dopaminergic hyperproduction, as 
in case of schizophrenia (Gotham et al., 1988; Knable & Weinberger, 1997). Too little or too 
much dopamine receptor activation leads to deficient operation of the neural mechanisms that 
are required for optimum performance in divergent-thinking creativity tasks (due to a lack of 
facilitation or excessive inhibition, respectively) thus resulting in diminished cognitive 
performance. This suggests that optimal functioning of the prefrontal cortex needs an optimal 
level of dopamine as described by an inverted U-shape curve (Cools et al., 2001; 
Vijayraghavan et al., 2007).  
It has been shown by a large number of studies that positive affect systematically 
influences performance on many cognitive tasks. Thedopamine theory of positive affect 
(Ashby, 1999) accounts for many of these effects by assuming that positive affect is 
associated with increased brain dopamine levels. The theory accounts for influences of 
positive affect on olfaction, the consolidation of l ng-term (i.e., episodic) memories, working 
memory, and creative problem solving. It assumes that creative problem solving is improved, 
in part, because increased dopamine release in the anterior cingulate improves cognitive 
flexibility and facilitates the selection of cognitive perspective. This theory, along with 
research on the impact of positive affect on creativ  performance, helps us to better 




It has been shown that during the course of normal aging, dopamine levels in the human 
brain decrease by 7% or 8% during each decade of life (e.g, Gabrieli, 1995; van Domburg & 
ten Donkelaar, 1991). Considering the relation betwe n dopamine and cognitive 
performance, this raises the question whether cognitive flexibility and creative problem-
solving also diminish with age. It is generally assumed that people become less flexible and 
more rigid as they get older. A large amount of research revealed that cognitive flexibility 
does decrease during normal aging (e.g., Collins & Tellier, 1994; Stankov, 1988), but we are 
not aware of any study that examined the effect of age on performance on creative problem 
solving specifically on divergent thinking (Alternative Uses Task) and convergent thinking 
(Remote Associate Task). If we consider flexibility as the main component of divergent 
thinking, we can assume that performance on this type of creativity task decreases with 
aging.  
But at the individual level the actual picture might be more complex. Consider the results 
from chapter 3, where we demonstrated that optimal performance in divergent and 
convergent thinking is associated with medium and low levels of dopamine respectively. If 
we accept that aging is associated with a decrease of dopamine, we can assume that people 
with a high level of dopamine might be more creative as they get older in both divergent and 
convergent thinking (Figure 1, black-arrows). It is possible that a similar scenario applies to 
other cognitive tasks that relate to brain dopamine fu ction in an inverted U-shaped fashion, 
such as working memory tasks. In contrast to high-level dopamine individuals, it is likely 
that aging has no advantage or is even harmful for creative performance for people with low 
dopamine levels. More research is needed to examine this possibility in order to fully 











































Figure 1: Hypothetical functions relating performance in divergent and convergent thinking to the 
individual dopamine level. Estimates of group means re taken from Akbari Chermahini & Hommel 
(2010). Note that, depending on the base level of dopamine, an age-related decrease in dopamine 
might be beneficial for divergent and convergent thinking tasks for some clinical populations (e.g., 





Moving to clinical populations, our approach raises interesting questions regarding the 
impact of aging on performance. For instance, it predicts that people who suffer from too 
high levels of dopamine (such as in schizophrenia) should actually benefit from aging—due 
to the aging-induced decease in dopamine levels (Figure 1, gray-arrows). These and related 
considerations encourage novel questions and lines of research, which we believe can further 
increase our understanding of creative performance d the cognitive mechanism involved in 
an optimum level of creativity.  
Implications of the results of this thesis might also be important for education and 
business. If we consider creativity the fountainhead of human civilization, all progress and 
innovation depends on our ability to change existing thinking patterns, break with the 
present, and build something new. So, it is no surprise if we see managers seeking to boost 
creativity in their employees, school-teachers desiring to elevate creative problem solving 
among their pupils, and parents trying to bring out the artistic talent in their children. Based 
on the results of our research, we assume they can get better results if their training practice 
and interventions consider individual differences in dopaminergic functioning as well as the 
type of creativity that is intended to be enhanced. This certainly holds for the relationship 
between the effect of mood and individual dopamine lev ls in the context of performance in 
divergent thinking—as investigated in this thesis. Whether it also holds for the effect of 
mood on convergent thinking remains to be investigated. 
 
Creativity and mood: reciprocal effects 
In chapter 5 it was found that carrying out a task that requires creative thinking affects 
people's mood. Moreover, divergent and convergent thi king impact mood in opposite ways: 
while divergent thinking improves one's mood convergent thinking lowers it. This provides 
considerable support for the idea that mood and cogniti n are not just related, but that the 
relation is fully reciprocal (Bar, 2009; Gray, 2004; Gross, 2002; Salovey et al., 2002). This 
dissociation is consistent with Akbari Chermahini ad Hommel’s (2010) observation that 
divergent and convergent thinking are related to one's dopamine level—the common 
currency that apparently mediates the interaction—ad that these two relationships follow 
rather different functions. Performing divergent thinking and convergent thinking tasks 
evoke different, apparently even opposite stereotypical reactions which do not seem to reflect 
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individual performance and, thus, objective task difficulty. However, actually carrying out 
the task and the related thinking operations further boosts the task-specific mood changes to a 
degree that goes beyond possible stereotypical responses. In a broader perspective, this 
research’s findings demonstrate uncertainty principle (Heisenberg, 1927), according to which 
the act of measurement can change what is being measured. As it seems, engaging in a 
creativity task creates a mood swing in the direction that facilitates performance in that 
particular task. It can be conclude that mood and cognition are not just related, but that this 
relation is fully reciprocal. 
This fits with the theoretical considerations of Bar (2009) that there is a direct reciprocal 
relation between the cortical activation of associations and mood regulation, whereby 
positive mood promotes associative processing, and associative processing promotes positive 
mood. The activation of associations might be beneficial for improving mood because 
associations afford the generation of predictions, and prediction minimize uncertainty, thus 
reducing anxiety and stress, which are both concomitants of mood disorder. The second 
mood-related benefit of broad associative activation is that associations prevent persistent 
rumination, another hallmark of mood disorder, by distracting the thought process away from 
dwelling on a narrow, negative theme. Broad associative activation helps gain a broader 
perspective. This calls for a distinction between narrow and broad associative activations. 
Narrow associative thinking, or rumination, refers to associations that surround a narrow 
focus (Figure 2a). Broad associative activations, by contrast, active association that make 























Figure 2: Rumination versus broadly associative thinking. (a) The thought pattern typical of mood 
disorder involves rumination around a narrow focus. Even if this thought pattern is associative, it is 
limited in scope. Such constrained thought is proposed here to stem from hyper-inhibition from the 
MPFC (medial prefrontal cortex) to the MTL (medial temporal lobe). (b) The thought pattern in the 
brain of individuals without mood disorders is characterized by a broadly associative activation that, 
although still affected by inhibition signals (for functional guidance), can seamlessly disengage from
one focus and advance to another. (Reproduced from Bar, 2009; Trends in Cognitive Science. 13)  
MPFC MPFC
Rumination Broad Associative Activation
MTL MTL













































Figure 3: Performing a divergent thinking task might improve mood and change the associative 















As we mentioned earlier, results from chapter 5 show that performing a divergent 
thinking task elevates mood. This result can be explained by the assumption that broad 
associative activation improves mood. This finding has the practical implication that 
performing a divergent thinking task might be a non-invasive method for treating mood 
disorders, especially in people who suffer from rumination (negative narrow scope of 
attention) that is associated with depression. The training and restructuring of the ability for 
broad associative thinking can elicit improvements that range from structure modification to 
mood and behavior (Figure 3). Future research needs to investigate whether performing a 
divergent thinking task can be useful to change the narrow focus and rumination in 
individuals with depression to broad associative activ tion to at least some degree, and 
improve their mood. 
 
Creativity and cognitive control 
Convergent and divergent thinking apparently induce diff rent cognitive control states in 
individuals and support performance of individuals in different cognitive tasks in different 
ways. The after-effect of performing divergent and convergent thinking tasks on 5 cognitive 
tasks (Global-Local, Stroop, Simon, Stop-Signal, Atten ional Blink) was investigated and 
reported in chapter 6. Results from five experiments revealed that convergent thinking 
benefited performance in the tasks that are suspected to induce conflict between perceptual 
interpretations (Global-Local task), semantic (semantic-Stroop task), and response codes 
(Simon task) by establishing a relatively strong top-d wn cognitive-control state and also 
reduce various sorts of cognitive conflict. Cognitive control induced by convergent thinking 
was not beneficial for all cognitive tasks. In contras  divergent thinking induces cognitive 
control state and benefits tasks that apply less top-down control (such as Attentional Blink 
task).  
The findings suggest a scenario according to which convergent and divergent thinking are 
associated with specific control states that people can apparently establish when needed. 
Nevertheless, this does not rule out the possibility that some individuals are more able, 
proficient, or practiced in establishing one or another of these states. In that sense, the 
findings do not rule out the possibility that some individuals are, or at least can be more 
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creative than others—the trait account of creativity. Thereby it is suggested that creativity is 
a matter of intra-individual variability where the same person can be more or less creative.  
The five studies presented in chapters 2-6 illuminate that human creativity is not a unitary 
concept and is consistent with conclusions from earlier esearch that creativity tasks differ 
substantially in their sensitivity for particular aspects of creative performance (Baas, De 
Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008). The findings provide strong evidence that divergent-thinking and 
convergent-thinking tasks are two different types of tasks to measure two types of creativity 
and that they do not measure the same thing. It can be said that divergent and convergent 
thinking are ideal types, and not mutually exclusive. Both convergent and divergent thinking 
are needed for any truly creative activity; latter presumably more in leading brainstorming 
phase that considers all possible options and former more in the following phase in which the 
preferred option is further thought through and worked out.  
Taken together, the results of the five empirical chapter of this thesis indicate that 
creativity, an important skill that is often thought of as a stable characteristic of people, can 
be facilitated by a transient pleasant affective state. Moreover, the affective state sufficient to 
do this can be induced subtly, by small everyday events. This suggests that creativity can be 
fostered by appropriate modification of the physical or interpersonal environment. But one 
should be aware that not everybody benefited from god mood.  
The most important implication of the results in this thesis is for future research on 
individual differences and creative performance as well as on mood and creativity research.  
Furthermore, by identifying cognitive mechanism and the basic principles of creativity, 
researchers might be able to enhance this process btter in the future, with potentially 
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In dit proefschrift wordt in vijf empirische hoofdstukken de functionele en  
neuromodulatorische basis van creativiteit onderzocht. Aangezien er in de wetenschappelijke 
gemeenschap geen consensus is over de definitie van cre tiviteit is het belangrijk om, zowel 
het proces dat bestudeerd wordt en het soort taken of testen die worden gebruikt om het 
concept van interesse te meten te definiëren. In dit proefschrift worden twee denkstijlen 
verondersteld als twee verschillende vormen van creativiteit: divergent denken en convergent 
denken. De ‘Alternatieve gebruiken taak’ (Alternative Uses Task’ of AUT, Guilford, 1967) 
werd gebruikt om divergent denken te meten, de ‘Verre associaten taak’ (Remote Associate 
Task of RAT, Mednick, 1962) werd gebruikt om convergent denken te meten.  
De proefpersonen in dit onderzoek hadden Nederlands als moedertaal, dus werden 
Nederlandse versies van de creativiteitstesten gemaakt. De AUT was eenvoudig aan te 
passen en de participanten konden makkelijk gevraagd worden om zo veel mogelijk 
manieren te bedenken om een veelvoorkomend huishoudelijk artikel te gebruiken in hun 
eigen taal. De RAT is anders van aard, waardoor het noodzakelijk was om een Nederlandse 
versie te ontwikkelen en te valideren.  
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt de ontwikkeling van validatie van een Nederlandse versie van de 
RAT gerapporteerd bestaande uit 30 items. Item-respons theorie is toegepast om een korte, 
gevalideerde 22- items test te maken uit de 30 itemtest. The 22-item test is betrouwbaar en 
erg nuttig om convergent denken te meten in onderzoek met tijdsrestricties. De IRT 
benadering is ook gebruikt om moeilijkheid- en onderscheidingsparameters voor ieder item 
te bepalen, zodat men items kan kiezen die passen bij de steekproef (bijvoorbeeld: een groep 
mensen met lage of hoge capaciteit) en het doel van het onderzoek. 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt onderzocht of individuele maten van creativiteit zouden correleren met 
individuele oog knippersnelheid (eye-blink rate of EBR), hetgeen kan wijzen op een relatie 
tussen creativiteit en dopamine. De relatie tussen cr ativiteit, intelligentie, en EBR -  een 
klinische marker van de brein dopamine functie -  is onderzocht. Het resultaat van drie 
experimenten met drie aparte groepen van participanten liet zien dat de prestatie op een 
intelligentietest (fluid intelligence) niet afhangt van brein dopamine functie terwijl creatieve 
prestatie dat wel doet: resultaten lieten een negatieve correlatie zien tussen convergent 
171 
 
denken en dopamine level en prestatie op de divergent denken test volgende een inverse U-
vorm relatie met individuele dopamine level.  
De resultaten van de experimenten, die in hoofdstuk 3 zijn gerapporteerd zijn gebruikt als 
het basis idee voor een experiment waarin stemming wordt geïnduceerd (mood induction), en 
is gerapporteerd in hoofdstuk 4. De resultaten van een (positieve of negatieve) 
stemmingsinductie experiment laten zien dat positieve stemming vergeleken met negatieve 
stemming voor een toename van EBR en een toegenomen creatieve prestatie leidde op een 
divergent denken test. Deze resultaten zijn consistent met eerder onderzoek dat laat zien dat 
positieve stemming creatieve prestatie kan doen toeem n (Isen et al., 1987) én dat de 
invloed van positieve stemming op cognitieve prestatie veroorzaakt wordt door toegenomen 
dopamine niveaus (Ashby et al, 1999). Positieve stemming zorgt voor een significante 
toename van EBR en toegenomen flexibiliteit in een divergent denken taak bij mensen met 
een laag dopamine niveau. Maar er is een ander scenario voor mensen met een gemiddeld of 
hoog niveau van dopamine, omdat de winst van positieve stemming klein was en niet 
significant. Men kan concluderen dat de impact van positieve stemming op de prestatie van 
divergent denken afhangt van de dopamine niveaus van een individu.  
Hoofdstuk 5 presenteert de resultaten van een experiment, waarin werd onderzocht wat de 
invloed is van het maken van een creativiteitstest (divergent vs. convergent denken) op 
stemming. Resultaten ondersteunen het idee dat stemming en cognitie niet alleen gerelateerd 
zijn maar dat deze relatie volledig wederkerig is (Bar, 2009; Gray, 2004; Gross, 2002; 
Salovey et al., 2002).  
Het uitvoeren van divergente en convergente denktaken leidt tot verschillende modi van 
cognitieve controle. Dit idee is onderzocht in hoofdstuk 6 door middel van het zoeken naar 
na effecten van het maken van de twee creativiteittesten op vijf bekende cognitieve taken (1-
Global-Local, 2-Stroop, 3-Simon, 4-Stop-Signal, 5-Attentional Blink). De resultaten laten 
zien dat de controlemodus die geïnduceerd wordt door c nvergent denken de prestatie 
verbeterde op cognitieve taken waarvoor top-down cotrole nodig is, en een sterke lokale 
competitie tussen representaties van relevante en irr levante informatie (zoals de Stroop 
taak); divergente denktaken daarentegen, induceerden een cognitieve controlemodus die de 
prestatie verbeterde op taken die voordeel hebben van minder top-down controle, zoals de 
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